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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Civil Courts' Jurisdictions Over Church
Doctrines
Seldom has a decision touched off such a furor of lay discussion in
North Carolina as did that of Reid v. Johnston.1 Briefly, the facts of
that decision are these: The North Rocky Mount Baptist Church was
a member of the North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions.
The majority of its membership, led by the pastor, voted to disaffiliate
from both those associations and to enroll the church into membership
in the General Association of Regular Baptist Churches. The legal
issue was whether the majority could control the property of the church
as against the minority who wished to remain affiliated with the North
Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The court held that the
minority should control the property. The reasoning was that only the
church could control its property and the church was those members-
even a minority-who adhere to the customs, practices and doctrines
accepted by both groups before dissension. Since the tenets of the
Southern Baptist and North Carolina Baptist Conventions had been
accepted by both groups before dissension, the minority who remained
loyal to those conventions controlled the property.
This raises the fundamental issue-when will civil courts take juris-
diction over, and adjudicate ecclesiastical doctrines?
It is well settled, that under our government, founded as it is, on
separation of church and state, civil courts will not entertain contro-
versies relating to strictly ecclesiastical doctrines or laws. 2 Generally,
civil courts will investigate ecclesiastical matters if property rights are
involved. A Texas case states a common formulation of the principle :3
"In disputes between factions of religious societies the only questions
)vhich the civil courts are authorized to determine are those affecting
property rights. In such controversies, ecclesiastical or doctrinal ques-
tions will only be inquired in so far as may be necessary to determine
the property rights of the parties."
In Watson v. Jones,4 generally accepted as the leading case on the
subject, the court classifies the types of situations which come before
the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by an ecclesiastical
1241 N. C. 201, 85 S. E. 2d 114 (1954), See Case Survey 34 N. C. L. REv. 26
(1955).
76 C. J. S., Religious Societies, Sec. 86 (1952).
'Mendolsohn v. Gordon, 156 S. W. 1149 Tex. Civ. App. (1913).
'13 Wall. (U. S. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872).
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body in which there has been a schism as follows: (1). Where the
property is held by the religious society subject to an express trust, i.e.
where the instrument by its terms spells out to what uses the property
is to be devoted. (2). Where the property is held by a hierarchial
church-a church over which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals
with ultimate power of control over the whole membership. (3). Where
the property is held by a church which is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical organizations "and, so far as church government is con-
cerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority."5
Property Subject to an Express Trust
The first of these situations may be illustrated by assuming that
a decedent had devised land "to the Downtown Baptist Church as long
as that church follows the doctrine of total immersion," and that a
majority of that church had later rejected that doctrine. To which
group would the control of the devised property remain? As stated
by the Tennessee court in Nance v. Busby:6 "In the case of a definite
trust for the maintainance of a particular faith or form of worship the
court will even go so far as to prevent the diversion of the property by
the action of the majority of the beneficiaries, and if there be a minority
who adhere to the original principles, such minority will be held to
comprise the exclusive beneficiaries, and entitled to the control and
enjoyment of the property without interference by the unfaithful ma-
jority." In other words, courts will enforce the terms of a trust and
thereby carry out the settlor's expressed intent wherever possible. This
principle, with reference to property held by a congregational or inde-
pendent society subject to an express trust, is generally conceded.
However, where the terms of the trust are not clearly spelled out, a
question of construction remains as to the exact uses to which the prop-
erty is restricted. It is in determining this question that the civil courts
do become involved in the investigation and comparison of religious doc-
trines.
Property of a Hierarchical Church
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated the applicable
principle in this area in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas CathedraU' At issue
in that case was the beneficial use of the St. Nicholas Cathedral, the seat
of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America. In 1924 the plain-
tiffs, who represented most of the Russian Orthodox Churches in the
United States, seceded from the administrative control of the Moscow
Patriarch and formed the Independent American Church. That action
5 Id. at 718, 20 L. Ed. 666 at 674.
'91 Tenn. 303, 18 S. W. 874 (1892).
7 344 U. S. 94 (1952).
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was taken because of attempts of the Soviet Government to control
the patriarchate. In asserting the right to the property, the plaintiffs
raised no question as to the legitimacy of the Patriarch, or as to his
appointments, or as to the orthodoxy of the Mother church, but relied
on a New York statute which stated that the beneficial owner of all
Russian Orthodox Church property in the state was the Independent
American Church. 8  The New York Court of Appeals held for the
plaintiffs and found that the statute was within the province of the
legislature in that it was a legitimate supervision of religious corpora-
tions "and was a recognition, reasonably founded, that the Church in
Moscow was no longer capable of functioning as a true religious body,
but had become a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed
to implement its foreign policy."9
The Supreme Court reversed and held the statute to be invalid.
The decision was put squarely in terms of religious liberty-the court
said that such statutory transfer of control of church property "violates
the Fourteenth Amendment. It prohibits in this country the free
exercise of religion."' 0 The court relied heavily on the Watson case,
which itself upheld the right of the general Presbyterian judicatory to
property with which a proslavery congregation had seceded. The
Supreme Court in the Watson case said, "it is of the essence of these
religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be
binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance.""
One writer expressed the result of the decision in the Kedroff
case in this manner, "The Court thus raised to the dignity of a consti-
tutional right a hitherto debated principle of American Church law-
the principle that the property of a hierarchical church is to be dis-
posed of in accordance with the decision of its rulers, however sound
the reasons and however great the number of church members defying
this authority."' 2
Propert3 Not Subject to an Express Trust
If property were donated to the "Downtown Baptist Church" without
any specific trust being impressed thereon and subsequently a majority
of members of that church voted for an act or course of conduct different
from that which had existed previously, would the majority control the
church property?
'. Y. RELIGIOUS CORP. LAW §§ 105-08 (1945).
p302 N. Y. 1, 33, 96 N. E. 2d 56, 74 (1951), See note 64 HARv. L. REv. 1360
(1951).103 44 U. S. at 107.
1 13 Wall. (U. S.) 679, 729, 20 L. Ed. 666, 676 (1872).
167 HARv. L. REv. 110 (1953).
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The general rule is that the majority faction of an independent or
congregational church, however regular in its actions or procedures in
other respects, may not, as against a faithful minority, divert the property
of the church to another denomination or to support doctrines radically
and fundamentally opposed to the characteristic doctrines of the church
even though the property is subject to no express or specific trust.18
This differs from the rule with regard to expressly held trust property
in that in this area some changes are possible, while with respect to
property held by an express trust, the specific terms of the trust cannot,
by majority vote, be set aside or departed from.
Two questions arise here: Whether the change was a fundamental
or radical departure from previous doctrine? Should a civil court
decide whether the issue involved in such a fundamental change?
In most matters of church doctrine, the duly constituted tribunal will
decide such questions. Civil courts will not ordinarily attempt to inter-
fere with the decision of that tribunal, but will leave matters of doc-
trinal differences to be ironed out within the church. 4 It is generally
conceded that the "tribunal" referred to in congregational or independent
churches is the majority of the membership meeting in due course. A
recent summary of the law in this area is found in the following Alabama
decision :'5
"But to justify court interference it must be shown that the
purpose of the majority [of a Baptist church] is to make a
gratuitous transfer of the property to another denomination, or
to disavow and depart from the characteristic, distinctive doc-
trines and practices of the society. Such purpose must appear
either from an open avowal on the part of the majority, or from
its acts and conduct manifesting such purpose beyond all reason-
able doubt. It is not enough that a schism or division has de-
veloped among the members on account of differences of opinion
in the interpretation and application of the declared doctrines
and practices of the society; such matters must be settled by the
society itself in its own way."
One specific guidepost stands out in this area, and that is that the
withdrawal from a voluntary ecclesiastical connection is not considered
a change in fundamental doctrines or practices. As one authority ex-
" Bogard v. Boone, 200 Ky. 572, 255 S. W. 112 (1923) ; Grupe v. Radsill, 101
N. J. Eq. 145, 136 At. 911 (1927). Contra, Christian Church v. Crystal, 78 Cal.
App. 1, 247 Pac. 609 (1926), But c.f. Dyer v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 260,
271 Pac. 113 (1928).
", Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S. E. 184 (1907).
"Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So. 2d 101 (1952). For cases construing
what are fundamental changes, see Annot. 8 A. L. P_ 113 (1920), and Annot. 70
A. L. R. 83 (1931).
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presses it, "it is to be observed that the rule stated ... that the majority
faction of an independent or congregational society may not divert the
property from the denomination to which the society belongs or from
the fundamental and distinctive doctrines or tenets to which it originally
subscribed, does not prevent the majority faction of such a society, over
the objection of the minority faction, from severing a voluntary ecclesi-
astical connection of the society with another body." 16
In the case of Wehmer v. Fokenga' a rather strong decision, the
Nebraska court was faced with deciding whether the majority faction
of a Lutheran church, after having voted to leave the synod to which
they had belonged and to join another synod, could control the church
property. The trial court found as fact that the two synods differed
in both doctrine and tenets.' 8 The court held that the finding of the
trial court could not be sustained because the civil courts are not so
equipped as to make findings on ecclesiastical dogma. The court pre-
ferred to leave the question of fundamental tenets and doctrines to the
decision of the rulers of the church-the majority of members in the
local church.
The North Carolina Position 9
A proper application of the rule applied to congregational churches
is found in the case of Wheeles v. Barrett.20  Property had been con-
veyed to the "City Mission of Rocky Mount" which was a non-denom-
inational religious and social organization promoting religious training,
education, Christian unity, and the spreading of the Gospel. Subse-
quently, a majority of members voted to form, from the Mission, "The
Central Baptist Church." After this was done the issue of control of the
property arose and the court held that the diversion of the property by
the majority was without authority in law. This seems clearly within
'
0 Annot. 8 A. L. R. 105, 123 (1920).
1757 Neb. 510, 78 N. W. 28 (1899).
"8 ,. . for instance, the congregations in the Iowa synod practice what is called
'close communion'-that is, these congregations do not permit members of other
Christian churches to commune with them, while the . . . General synod admit all
Christians to their communion table. The congregations of the Iowa synod believe
in the doctrine of Chiliasm, or that Christ will visibly reign on earth for a thousand
years, ... the General synod reject this doctrine. In the matters of church
discipline or government the congregations of the Iowa synod will not allow a
minister belonging to another synod to officiate, ... the General synod permit
ministers of any synod to act as their pastors. The congregations of the Iowa
synod do not permit their members to belong to secret societies .... the Generaf
synod do not control their members as to that respect." 57 Neb. 510, 512, 78
N. W. 28 (1899).
1 Due to considerations of space the scope of the North Carolina position will
be limited to the problem presented in the principal case, i.e. non-hierarchical
churches where the property is not subject to an express trust. For cases where
property is held subject to an express trust, see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 61-3 and an-
notations thereto.2 0229 N. C. 282, 49 S. E. 2d 629 (1948).
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the general rule because there was a diversion of the property of the
Mission to another and entirely different organization, whose doctrines
were directly opposite to those of the original Mission.
Similarly, the decision in Dix v. Prutt21 follows the majority
rule of allowing the church property to be controlled by a minority
if the majority diverts the property of the church for use in another
denomination or to support of doctrines fundamentally or radically differ-
ent to the characteristic doctrines of the society as it existed before the
diversion. Basically, the facts in that case were: A minister in Danville,
Va. had been expelled from the Primitive Baptist Church of that city.
He had been given employment as a minister in Dan River after the
majority of members, with knowledge of his expulsion, had so voted.
The minority introduced evidence of the customs of Primitive Baptist
churches among which was a tenet that once a member had been expelled
from a church, he could not be accepted in another Primitive Baptist
church without having first been taken back into fellowship by the ex-
pelling church. Our court held that the majority had violated a funda-
mental doctrine of the church by employing an expelled minister and
awarded the control of property to the minority.
While the general rule was correctly stated in the Dix case there
appears to be a conflict in its application. The Alabama court when
faced with an almost identical fact situation, had this to say on the
problem.2 2 "So we will not undertake to rationalize the claimed funda-
mental differences which gave rise to the dissatisfaction in the Mount
Olive congregation. It is sufficient to say that the court, if it would,
could not determine with the slightest degree of accuracy that the method
of exclusion of Copeland from membership was that radical departure
of doctrine to justify court action."
In Organ Meeting House v. Seaford23 the majority of members of
a Lutheran church declared that the local church was leaving the synod
to which the church formerly belonged and taking membership in a
different synod, previously unknown to the Lutheran church. The
plaintiffs were trustees under the original conveyance and opposed the
movement to the new synod. The court held that it would not decide a
religious controversy between the members of the church. The court
said, "with respect to the allegation made by the plaintiffs (minority),
that the defendants, or the church they represent, have strayed from the
true faith, or that errors have crept into the church government, the
answer is, that on that question, it is not for them nor this Court to
21 194 N. C. 64, 138 S. E. 412 (1927).
"
2Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617
(1949).
2- 16 N. C. 453 (1830).
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decide. It might be more than difficult to qualify any earthly tribunal
to decide it."24
In North Carolina Christian Conference v. Allen,2 6 the court held
that a voluntary association with which an independent church is
affiliated has no control over that local church. In that case it was
held that a "conference" had no right or interest in the church property
as it was not a proper party to a suit involving the control of the church
property. The dispute arose out of the refusal of the majority of mem-
bers to accept a pastor sent by the "conference." The court by way of
explanation of the differences between hierarchical and independent
churches said, "The churches of the congregational system often combine
into associations, conferences and general conventions. But unlike such
organizations under the connectional system, these bodies under the
congregational system are purely voluntary associations for the purpose
of joining their efforts of missions and similar work, but having no
supervision, control, or governmental authority of any kind whatsoever
over the individual congregations, which are absolutely independent of
each other."26  This language by Chief Justice Clark seems strong
enough to allow a voluntary severence from such association or con-
vention by a local church of the congregational form without interference
of a civil court, i.e. that such severence is not a fundamental or radical
change of doctrine.
A converse of severence from a voluntary association is found in
Windley v. McCliney.2 There, property was deeded to "Trustees of
the Free Will Baptist Church of Pantego" and the congregation subse-
quently united with other churches and changed its name to the "United
American Free Will Baptist Church." (A minority of the local church
then objected to a revision of discipline for which the delegate of the
local church had voted.) The minority, going back to the "Free Will
Baptist Church of Pantego" claimed the church property because of the
original designation in the deed to that church. The trial court found
as fact that the discipline involved did not essentially differ in doctrine
from what had gone on before. The Supreme Court affirmed a judg-
ment which excluded neither faction from the use of the church building,
but recognized the ownership and control as being in the whole member-
ship "and that their will must be determined by the majority."28 The
court then, in effect, held that the local church did not lose its independ-
ence or identity as the "Free Will Baptist Church of Pantego" by being
a member of the association.
21 Id. at 455.
" 156 N. C. 524, 72 S. E. 617 (1911).
20 Id. at 526, 72 S. E. at 618.
27 161 N. C. 318, 77 S. E. 226 (1913).
28 Id. at 321, 77 S. E. at 228.
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Thus if a majority of the members votes to associate with a con-
vention against the wishes of the minority, there being no other change
in discipline, and the court, as here, upholds that right, then logically
it would appear that a majority could sever its relationship with the
convention and the court uphold that action.
The Reid29 case is the latest North Carolina decision on the problem.
The court, in attempting to distinguish the decision in the Organ Meeting
House30 case, held that the majority did more than merely disaffiliate
from the North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The court
listed six items, in substance as follows: (1). They ceased all con-
nection with the above mentioned Baptist conventions and withdrew
financial support of agencies sponsored by those conventions, except for
a Baptist orphanage. (2). After they disaffiliated they continued as an
Independent Baptist Church. (3). They ceased to use Sunday School
literature approved by the Southern Baptist Convention and began using
literature supplied by the General Association of Regular Baptist
Churches, in which organization they had planned to enroll. (4). The
Board of Deacons had approved the exclusive control of the pulpit by
the church's minister, Mr. Johnston. (5). They discharged several
Sunday School teachers for the reason that they opposed the views
of the majority of members. (6). Finally, the minister had done all
he could to separate himself as far as possible from the programs of the
North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions.
It is submitted that all of the above items do not successfully dis-
tinguish this case from the Organ Meeting House decision, and that
all that the majority did was implement their decision to leave the
North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The cessation of
literature and financial support to those Conventions flowed naturally
and proximately from the decision to disaffiliate. The release of em-
ployees who did not believe or teach what the majority thought, was
within the prerogative of any employer. Is the court saying that it is
permissible for the group to disaffiliate but that they must continue to
support in every manner-financially, spiritually and morally, those
organizations which they had previously voted to abandon?
The above argument seems to be strengthened by this quotation from
the Organ Meeting House case. "Whether the grantor would have
any claim to it, [church property] in case the church were to become
Mohammedan or Pagan, or profess their belief in the heathen mythology,
I am not now, nor shall I ever be called upon to give an opinion. I
am also spared from giving any opinion, provided they worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own conscience. But I am free
2D 241 N. C. 201, 85 S. E. 2d 114 (1954).
30 16 N. C. 454 (1830).
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to give the opinion, that as long as their religious tenets and devotions
are confined to the sphere of Christianity, the grantor can have no
claim; .... If the grantor has no right, on what foundation does the
plaintiffs claim rest? It appears, that they [plaintiffs] are seceders from
the church, and are not the trustees or representatives of it; they were a
minority of the members before their secession. Had they remained
in the church, they must have yielded to the government of the majority.
Much less can they have any control over it, when" they are no part of
it. It is a rule applicaable to aggregate corporations or to societies, that
the will of the majority must govern. A contrary rule would be as ab-
surd, as to say, that a lesser number contained more units than a greater.
"With respect to the allegation made by the plaintiffs, that the de-
fendants, or the church they represent, have strayed from the true
faith ... on that question, it is not for them, nor this Court to decide.
It might be more than difficult to qualify any earthly tribunal to decide
it.",8 '
On principle it would seem desirable that a religious society in a
country of religious equality should be allowed to change its faith with-
out losing its property, where no express trust is present and the church
is non-hierarchical. It is submitted that the general rule in this area
should be construed in the light of the words and spirit of the Organ
Meeting House case, and that as long as the majority "worship Almighty
God according to dictates of their own conscience" or at least remain
"confined to the sphere of Christianity," they should control the prop-
erty of the church. Civil courts should adopt the view of the Nebraska
court in the Wehmer case, "whether the religious teachings, faith, and
church polity of these synods differed in essential particulars was and
is a question for the ecclesiastical tribunals, not the civil courts. '8 2 To
hold otherwise is to have a temporal court adjudicate religious doctrines
under the guise of "property rights."
MOPTON A. SMITH.
Constitutional Law-Second Class Mail
Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to
Congress the power to establish post offices. Since the dissemination of
news has always been considered a contribution to the public good,
special mailing rates were accorded to newspapers in 1792.1 In 1879
Congress divided the mails into four classes,2 with matters coming within
,Id. at 455.
"57 Neb. 510, 516, 78 N. W. 28, 30 (1899).
'Act of February 20, 1792, I STAT. 232.
2 See. 7 of the Classification Act of 1879, as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 221 (1926)
-provides:
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the second class afforded the most favorable rate. Certain objective
standards were set to determine which publications qualified for this
rate. Sections 10 and 14 of the Classification Act of 1879 as amended
in sections 224 and 226 of title 39 of the United States Code provides:
"Mailable matter of the second class shall embrace all newspapers
and other periodical publications which are issued at stated in-
tervals, and as frequently as four times a year, and are within
the conditions named in 225 and 226 of this Title."8
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the conditions upon which
a publication shall be admitted to the second class mail are as
follows:
First. It must be issued at stated intervals, as frequently as four
times a year, and bear a date of issue, and be numbered consecu-
tively. Second. It must be issued from a known office of publica-
tion. Third. It must be formed of printed paper sheets, without
board, cloth, leather, or other substantial binding, such as dis-
tinguishes printed books for preservation from periodical publica-
tions. Fourth. It must be originated and published for the
dissemination of information of a public character, or devoted to
literature, the sciences, arts or some special industry, and having
a legitimate list of subscribers. Nothing herein contained shall
be construed as to admit to the second class rate regular publica-
tions designed primarily for advertising purposes, or for free
circulation, or for circulation at nominal rates." 4
The constitutional validity of these standards was upheld in the case
of Lewis Publishing Company v. Morgan,5 which case further upheld an
act of Congress requiring publishers intending to use the facilities of
second class mail to file at stated intervals with the Postmaster General
certain information concerning their publications. This, said the court,
was an incident necessary to Congress' power to classify.
The determination of what particular publications are to be properly
included or excluded from second-class mail carriage under the above
"Mailable matter shall be divided into four classes:
First, written matter;
Second, periodical publications;
Third, Miscellaneous printed matter and other mailable matter not in the
first, second or fourth classes.
Fourth, merchandise and other mailable matter weighing not less than eight
ounces, and not in any other class."
120 STAT. 359, 39 U. S. C. § 224 (1926).
'20 STAT. 359, 39 U. S. C. § 226 (1926).
'229 U. S. 288 (1912).
'Post Office Appropriation Act of August 24, 1912, 37 STAT. 539, 553, 554.
[Vol. 34
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statutes is necessarily delegated to the Post Office Department.7 It may
be readily seen that this determination is of great economic importance
to publishers.8 The amount of discretion which the Postmaster General
may use in deciding whether or not a particular publication is eligible to
travel through the mails at a second-class postal rate has been a constant
source of litigation in the federal courts. It has been stated that "Where
the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judg-
ment and discretion of the head of a department, his decision thereon is
conclusive, and even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law
alone, his action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correct-
ness, and the courts will not ordinarily review it, although they have the
power and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing."9  It would
thus appear that the Postmaster General's determination of whether a
publication was "issued as frequently as four times a year," "numbered
consecutively," and "formed of printed paper sheets without board, cloth
or leather binding" would be conclusive, and not reviewable by the
courts.
A question which has caused some controversy has been the interpre-
tion of the meaning of the word "periodical" within section 224 of title
39 of the United States Code. The problem usually involved is whether
the particular publication is a periodical and thus eligible to qualify for
second-class rates, or is a book, complete in itself,10 and subject to the
higher third-class rates. In Houghton v. Payne," the court stated:
"But while section 1412 lays down certain conditions requisite to
the admission of a publication as to mail matter of the second-
class, it does not define a periodical, or declare that upon com-
pliance with these conditions the publication shall be deemed
such. In other words it defines certain requisites of a periodical,
but does not declare that they shall be the only requisites. Under
section 10 the publication must be a periodical publication; which
means, we think, that it shall not only have the feature of perio-
'42 STAT. 24, 5 U. S. C. § 369 (1921) states that it shall be the duty of the
Postmaster General to superintend generally the business of the department and
to execute all laws relative to the Postal Service.8In Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146, 151 (1945) it was found that the
second class mailing privilege was worth $500,000 a year to Esquire Magazine.
"A newspaper editor fears being put out of business by the administrative denial
of the second-class mailing privilege much more than the prospect of prison subject
to a jury trial." CHAFFE, FREEDom OF SPEECH, p. 199 (1920).
'Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1903).
10 "Mail matter of the third class shall include books, circulars, and other matter
wholly in print (except newspapers and other periodicals entered as second class
matter) . . ." 43 STAT. 1067 U. S. C. § 235 (1926).11194 U. S. 88 (1903).
1 Section 14 of the Classification Act of 1879.
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dicity, but that it shall be a periodical in the ordinary meaning of
the term.' 31
The court relied on the definition of a periodical stated by Century Dic-
tionary to be "a publication issued at regular intervals in successive
numbers or parts, each of which (properly) contains matter on a variety
of topics and no one of which is contemplated as forming a book of
itself,"'14 and concluded that the Postmaster General properly used his
discretion in determining that the publication of the plaintiff was not a
"periodical publication" within the meaning of the statute. In a later
decision to the same effect, the court stated, "But we think that although
the question is largely one of law, there is some discretion left in the
Postmaster General with respect to the classification of such publications
as mail matter, and that the exercise of such discretion ought not to be
interfered with unless the court be clearly of the opinion that it was
wrong."'15
Congress has made certain matter nonmailable. Section 1461 of title
18 of the United States Code provides that no "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other
publication of an indecent character" may be conveyed in the mails
under a penalty of fine and imprisonment. For purposes of exclusion
from the mails the Postmaster General is given the power to determine
what mater is obscene under the standards set by Congress, subject to
a hearing and review by the courts.'0
In Milwaukee Publishing Company v. Burlesony it was held that
under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,8 declaring periodicals con-
taining subversive material nonmailable, the Postmaster had an implied
power to refuse second-class rates to an offender without denying it the
use of the mails altogether. A prior decision had established that Con-
gress had power to deny subversive publications the use of the mails
" 194 U. S. at 96. The publications in question (Riverside Literature Series)
were small books, 43/ by 7 inches, in paper covers, issued from their office of pub-
lication monthly and numbered consecutively, but each number contained a novel,
story or a collection of short stories or poems by the same author.
1, Id. at 96.
"Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 107 (1903). "The Postmaster
General is charged with the duty of examining these publications and of determining
to which class of mail matter they properly belong, and we think his decision
should not be made the subject of judicial investigation in every case where one
of the parties thereto is dissatisfied." Id. at 108. See also: Smith v. Hitchcock,
226 U. S. 53, 57 (1912) ; Smith v. Payne, 194 U. S. 104 (1904).
" See LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS § 20, p. 608 (Autumn 1955) for a
thorough discussion of obscenity and the mails. For other matters which are non-
mailable, see 62 STAT. 762, 18 U. S. C. § 1302 (1948) pertaining to lotteries, and
63 STAT. 94, 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (1948) dealing with mail fraud.
" 255 U. S. 407 (1921). The dissent in this case was to the effect that there
was no authorization to deny second class privileges with regard to future issites of
a paper merely on the grounds that previous issues contained non-mailable matter.1840 STAT. 217 (1917).
(Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
altogether. 9 The Postmaster in this case had not rested his entire
argument on this point, but also contended that section 14 of the Classi-
fication Act of 1879, by its fourth condition, demanded that the publica-
tion contain something of positive worth in order to enjoy the second-
class mailing privilege.
This contention alone appeared to be the government's defense in
Hannegan v. Esquire.20 The Postmaster General had issued a citation
to Esquire Magazine to show cause why its second-class mailing permit
should not be revoked. After a scheduled hearing21 the permit was re-
voked, and Esquire brought suit to enjoin the Postmaster General from
enforcing the revocation. The Postmaster General did not contend that
the subject matter of Esquire Magazine was obscene and therefore non-
mailable, but stated that he revoked the permit because:
"The plain language of this statute does not assume that a publica-
tion must in fact be 'obscene' within the intendment of the postal
obscenity statutes before it can be found not to be 'originated
and published for the dissemination of information of a public
character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts or some spe-
cial industry'. . . . a publication to enjoy these unique mailing
privileges is bound to do more than refrain from disseminating
material which is obscene or bordering on the obscene. It is
under a positive duty to contribute to the public good and the
public welfare." 2
The court refuted this contention, saying that the Classification Act
plainly adopted a strictly objective test and left no discretion to the postal
authorities to withhold from a mailable periodical the second-class priv-
ilege because it failed to meet some standard of worth; that the more
particular descriptions of the first," third,24 and fourth,25 classes are
like the first three conditions of the second-class, and if the fourth con-
dition is read in context with these, it too must be taken to supply
standards which relate to the format of the publication and to the nature,
but not the quality, worth, or value of its contents; that in this view
"literature" and "arts" mean no more than productions which convey
1" Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
'0 327 U. S. 146 (1945).
"131 STAT. 1007, 39 U. S. C. 232 provides: "When any publication has been ac-
corded second-class mail privileges, the same shall not be suspended or annulled
until a hearing shall have been granted to the parties interested." In this case
the board designated for the hearing recommended that the permit not be revoked,
but the Postmaster General revoked notwithstanding such recommendation; so
it appears that the value of such hearing is dubious since the prosecutor, after the
hearing, becomes the judge.
22327 U. S. at 149 (1945).
20 20 STAT. 358, 39 U. S. C. § 222 (1926).
2'43 STAT. 1067, 39 U. S. C. § 235 (1926).
" 43 STAT. 1067, 39 U. S. C. § 240 (1926).
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ideas by words, pictures, or drawings; and that to uphold the Post-
master General's revocation would be saying that Congress granted him
the power of censorship, or the power to alone determine whether a
publication is good or bad for the public to read. This, said the court,
would be a radical change from the other standards regarding classifica-
tions, and "such a power is so abhorrent to our traditions that it
should not be easily inferred. '2 6
The Postmaster General in Esquire relied on the holding of Mil-
waukee Publishing Company, but as has been pointed out the matter
involved in the latter case was completely nonmailable. It appears then
that anything which the Postmaster General may properly declare non-
mailable, he may exclude from the second-class without denying mailing
privileges entirely, but where the matter involved is mailable he must
objectively apply the standards set by Congress.
The basis of the court's decision in the Esquire case was that Con-
gress had not intended to give to the Postmaster General the power of
enforcing tests of "positive worth" in determining whether a periodical
should be accorded second-class mailing privileges. The case suggests
the question of whether Congress could delegate such powers. It could
be argued that there is no constitutional right to cheap mail, that Con-
gress is not attempting to regulate the businesses of newspapers and
periodicals, but is merely performing a service, and in so doing may
name its conditions for performance. On the other hand, it may readily
be seen that the denial of second-class privilages would be likely to drive
a publisher out of business,- and in this respect actually would be a
regulation. The court of appeals in the Esquire case28 considered this
question and concluded that Congress might withdraw the second-class
privilege completely if it felt that the benefits of wide circulation were
not worth the cost of the subsidy, as there was no obligation to grant
it in the first place, but that Congress may not use the privilege as a
weapon to force compliance with its notions of what is worthwhile. To
allow a "merit test" would be to deny what is meant by freedom of
the press.
LEwis H. PARHAM, JR.
Criminal Law-Homicide---Application of Felony-Murder Rule When
Non-Felon Kills Felon
Under the common law a homicide, whether intentional or not, com-
mitted by a person in the perpetration of a felony, is murder by each
28Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. at 151.
"'Supra note 8.28 Esquire v. Walker, 151 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
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of the felons.1 Commission of the felony supplies malice, which is an
essential element of common law murder.2 This doctrine undisputedly
applies in cases where: (1) one of a group of robbers intentionally
shoots a person in order to rob him; (2) one of the group accidentally
shoots the victim of the robbery; (3) one of the group accidentally
fires and kills a bystander.3 Statutes stemming from this doctrine have
been enacted in all but four4 American states. The various statutes are
not uniform in their requirements as to the felonies that must be com-
mitted for the ensuing homicide to be murder. It may be any felony5
or some similar provision ;6 a crime punishable in certain ways;T the
specific felonies of arson, burglary, rape, and robbery ;8 these plus other
named felonies, 9 the most common additions being mayhem and kid-
napping; or the four previous named felonies "or any other felony." 10
I The scope of this note does not permit an extended analysis of the felony-
murder doctrine. For such an analysis see: WHARTON, HoMIcmE p. 112 (3rd
ed. 1907); 26 Am. Jurm, Homicide §§ 64-69 (1940); 40 C. J. S., Homicide § 21
(1944) ; Arent, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the
New York Statutes, 20 CoRN. L. Q. 228 (1934) ; Crum, Causal Relations anid the
Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WAsH. U. L. Q. 191; Perkins, A Re-Examination of
Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 557 (1934) ; Perkins, The Law of Homi-
cide, 36 J. Cum. L. 391, 401 (1946).
2 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 248 (5th ed. 1952).
'For a treatment of all the possible arrangements of parties in felony-murder
situations see Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53
DicK. L. REv. 3 (1949).
'Kentucky, Maine, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin; but see KEN. REv.
STAT. §§ 435.010-435.020 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. C. 130, § 1 (1954); S. C. CODE
ANN. § 16-51 (1952); TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE §§ 1207-1228, 1241, 1256 (Vernon
1948). The common law felony-murder rules would apply to some extent in all
these states.
I MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 619.08, 619.10 (1947); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-4
(1953) ; N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1044; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1937) ; S. D.
CODE § 13.2007 (1939); Wis. Cum. CODE § 940.03 (1955).
' ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 358, 363 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1009 (1953);
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 265, § 1 (1933).
'ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 314 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-3401 (1942);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2215 (1942); OmO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.010 (1955) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-30-3 (1953); VT. RFv. STAT. § 8240 (1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18-30 (Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5916 (1955); Wyo. ComP. STAT.
ANN. § 9-201 (1945).
'ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-2902 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. 9 41-2205 (1947);
CAL. PEN. CODE pt. 1, tit. 8, C. 1, § 189 (Deering Supp. 1953); COLO. REv. STAT.
c. 40, § 2-3 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8350 (1949); D. C. CODE §§ 22-2401,
2402 (1951) (31 STAT. c. 854) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 1954) ; IDAHO
CODE VOl. 4, c. 40, § 18-4003 (1948) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (1950) ; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1951); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 495-497 (Flack
1951); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.010 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 94-2503 (1947); Nm. REv. STAT. vol. 2, § 28-401 (1948); NEV. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 10068 (1950); N. H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. c. 585, § 1 (1955); N. 3. STAT.
ANN. § 2:138-2 (1939) ; N. D. REv. CODE § 12-2712 (1943) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, § 1 (1938); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2402 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.48.030 (1952).
"
0 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (Corrick 1949) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1953).
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These and other differences"" in the statutes must be kept in mind in
any discussion of this problem.
In the recent case of Comnwnwealth v. Thonas,12 a Pennsylvania
case, two men held up the proprietor of a store. After emptying the
cash register they ran out of the store and down the street in opposite
directions. The proprietor chased one of the robbers and killed him in
a gun battle. His cohort was tried and convicted of first degree murder
under the Pennsylvania felony-murder statute, which declares that "all
murder... which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt-
ing to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping,
shall be murder in the first degree."' 8  In a four to three decision the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the conviction, saying:
"If the defendant sets in motion the physical power of another,
he is liable for its result .... The felon's robbery set in motion
a chain of events which were or should have been within his
contemplation when the motion was initiated. He therefore
should be held responsible for any death which by direct and
almost inevitable sequence results from the original criminal
act."14
When a non-felon does the act causing death
Until recently it was uniformly held that the act causing death must
be in furtherance of a common purpose in order to be murder by all the
felons ;15 thus, when someone other than one of the felons did the im-
mediate act causing death, the felony-murder rule was not applicable.' 6
In State v. Oxendine,'7 where an innocent bystander was accidentally
killed by the intended victim of an assault with intent to kill, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the defendants were not guilty of
a' See notes 29 and 41 infra.2 Pa. -, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955).
' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930).
14 Commonwealth v. Thomas, - Pa. -, -, 117 A. 2d 204, 205 (1955).
"- Wilson v. State, 24 S. W. 409 (Tex. Cr. App. 1893) ; People v. Sobieskoda,
235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923).
" People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920) ; Butler v. People, 125
Ill. 641, 18 N. E. 338, 1 L. R. A. 211 (1888) (dictum, for a felony was not being
committed); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1085, 2 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 719 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 545, 83
Am. Dec. 705, 709 (1863) (where it was said by Bigelow, C. J., that if a man
in defending his home from a burglar were to kill someone else, "Can the burglar
in such a case be deemed guilty of criminal homicide? Certainly not.") ; State v.
Majors, 237 S. W. 486 (Mo. Sup. 1922); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa.
327, 184 At. 97 (1936) (where the charge of the court, indicating that defendant
rather than an outsider would have had to have fired the fatal shot to be guilty
of murder, was held to be proper) ; Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144
At. 534 (1928) (where a charge that if the fatal bullet was fired by one trying
to stop the robbery defendants would not be guilty of murder, was characterized
by the supreme court, not as incorrect, but as favorable to the defendanf).17187 N. C. 658, 122 S. E. 568 (1924).
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culpable homicide, there being no concert or purpose between de-
fendants and their intended victim.'8
The first variation from this rule came in the so-called "shield" cases
-cases in which the felon forced someone to occupy a position in the
line of fire of those trying to avert the felony, hoping, of course, that
his assailants would hold their fire. When the "shield" was killed, it
was held that the felon was guilty of murder because he had forced
the deceased to occupy a place of danger, causing his death.19
To tie in with felony-murder the theory of proximate cause, on which
theory the principal case is based, is not a new idea.20  The very nature
of the offence necessitates an application of some causation rule, but
there is a divergence of opinion as to what the rule should be. The
role of proximate cause under the classical view is that unless the felony
proximately causes the death no murder is committed. This rule is
negative in concept, preventing an inference of murder in such a case as
when a house burns down, killing the occupants, a burglar being in the
house at the time the fire started. But recent decisions tend to hold
that a felon is guilty of murder when a third person is killed by gunfire
intended for the felon in the prevention of the felony.2 ' This trend, of
" In the opinion it was said: "Suppose instead of killing an innocent bystander,
Proctor Locklear had killed.. . one of his assailants, would the law, under these
circumstances, hold the surviving assailants or confederates . .. criminally re-
sponsible for the homicide? We think not." Id. at 662, 122 S. E. at 570.
1 Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S. W. 2d 100 (1934) ; Keaton v. State, 41
Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55
S. W. 961 (1900).
" "The killing must have had an intimate relation and close connection with the
felony, and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it; and when the act
constituting the felony is in itself dangerous to life, the killing must be naturally
consequent to the felony. The death must have occurred as a-result or outcome of
the attempt to commit the felony." W~aRTox, HomiciDE p. 184 (3rd ed. 1907).
21 A policeman shot himself in a struggle with a felon for the felon's gun; the
felon was held guilty of murder, for "the shooting was a consequence naturally
to be expected from plaintiff in error's acts"; People v. Krausner, 315 I1. 485, 506,
146 N. E. 593, 601 (1925). In trying to prevent a robbery one intended victim
shot another; defendants were held guilty of murder because such a result "might
reasonably might be anticipated"; People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 255, 194 N. E. 539,
543 (1935). In a fact situation similar to that in the Payne case defendants were
held guilty of murder; "for whatever results follow from that natural and legal
use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible"; Commonwealth v.
Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 191, 53 A. 2d 736, 742 (1947), 17 FoRDHAm L. REv. 124(1948), 96 PA. L. Rtv. 278 (1948), 22 TuL. L. Rrv. 325 (1948). A policeman,
in trying to prevent the escape of robbers, shot another policeman; the robbers were
held guilty of murder, with reliance on the Moyer case; Commonwealth v. Al-
meida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595, 12 A. L. R. 2d 183 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U. S. 924 (1950), rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 950 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U. S. 867 (1950), 30 B. U. L. Ray. 422 (1950), 23 TEmP. L. Q. 423 (1950). In
trying to prevent a robbery deceased was killed when he wrested the gun away
from defendant and hit him with it, causing it to fire; defendant was held guilty
of murder because he set in motion the "cause which occasioned the death of
deceased"; Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 578, 251 S. W. 2d 404, 408 (1952).
See also People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N. W. 2d 201, cert. denied, 344
U. S. 845 (1952), rehearing denied, 344 U. S. 888 (1952), 1952 INmA. L. REv.(U. C. L. A.) 67, following the Moyer case; Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 1955) (dictum).
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which the principal case is a culmination, maintains that if the felony
proximately causes the death the felon is guilty of murder. This affirma-
tive application of proximate cause is not merely a different expression
of the earlier negative approach; it is an entirely different rule of causa-
tion, not necessarily following from the earlier rule. 22
That this affirmative application of proximate cause is a new con-
cept in felony-murder cases does not necessarily mean that the result
reached where a non-felon has immediately caused the death of another
non-felon is subject to criticism. In all of the cases which have followed
this trend the felony involved was one imminently dangerous to human
life,23 for the felon was armed and could expect armed resistance. 24 If
the cases holding the felons guilty of murder when a non-felon kills a
non-felon are limited to those situations where danger to others should
have been anticipated by the felons, they are not subject to strong crit-
icism, for this trend is but an extension of the "shield" cases25 and is
analogous to the concept of implying malice from wanton disregard of
human life.26 It must be remembered, however, that this trend is con-
trary to the earlier line of cases27 and perhaps reaches a less desirable
result in not fitting the punnishment to the crime actually committed
by the felon.
When a felon is killed
In the principal case, not only was the death-dealing force delivered
by someone other than one of the felons, but in addition the person
killed was one of the felons. The only other cases in which it has been
seriously contended that one felon should be held guilty of murder when
" The difference between these two rules can be illustrated by a more concrete
example: Unless a man strike another, he cannot be guilty of a battery. Butit does not follow from this that if a man strikes another he is guilty of a battery,
for there are many circumstances under which the striking of a person does not
amount to a battery.
2 Indeed, this seems to be the situation in all modern applications of the felony-
murder rule. According to Perkins, ". . . a study of the cases which repeat theformula that homicide committed while perpetrating a felony is murder, willdisclose that the other felony actually involved is one which may properly be
classified as 'dangerous,' . . ." A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
YALE L. J. at 561. But in a case where it was not raised in the record, the
North Carolina Supreme Court refused to express an opinion "as to whether the
words 'other felony' as used in the statute [N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953)]
mean any statutory felony, or are limited under the eiusdem generis principle to
felonies dangerous to life." State v. Streeton, 231 N. C. 301, 305, 56 S. E. 2d 649,
653 (1949).
"' Cases cited note 21 supra.
- Cases cited note 19 supra. The only difference in reasoning in the two
situations is that in the "shield" cases the felon caused the deceased to assume
a place of danger for protection, while in the recent trend the felon caused the
deceased to be in a place of danger by the commission of a dangerous felony.
" People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497 (1924) ; State v. Capps,
134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730 (1904) ; State v. Saunders, 108 W. Va. 148, 150 S. E.
519 (1929).
" Cases cited in note 16 supra.
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his co-felon was killed in the perpetration of their crime here cases
where (1) one of the felons killed another felon, 28 or (2) the deceased
felon accidentally caused his own death during the commission of the
felony. In People v. Ferlin,9 a California case, one arsonist was killed
in the fire; the other was held not guilty of murder because the death
was opposed to the conspiracy and not in furtherance of it. But in
Commonwealth v. Bolish ° in a similar situation, the defendant was held
guilty of murder on the proximate cause theory as previously expounded
in Pennsylvania. 3'
In only two cases previous to the principal case had the question
of murder even arisen when a felon in the perpetration of a felony was
killed by a non-felon. In People v. Garippo,32 an Illinois case, con-
victions of murder were reversed because, under the instructions given,
"plaintiffs in error might be held responsible for shooting done by an-
other person when there was no concert of action between him and
them."3 3 In People v. Udwin,3 4 decided under the New York statutes,35
it was implicit that if deceased had been killed by a prison guard instead
of by one of his fellow rioting prisoners the latter would not have been
guilty of murder.
Thus the Bolish case is the only previous case in which the death
of a felon otherwise than at the hands of his co-felons resulted in their
conviction of murder, and this on the theory of proximate cause. The
result reached in the Bolish case was criticized in able dissenting
8 Such killing, of course, must not be totally unconnected with the furtherance
of the felony undertaken. When D1 became "trigger happy" and took some
shots at a pasing automobile, D2 became furious at the needless risk of detection
and killed D1. Both D2 and D3 were held guilty of first degree murder. People
v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 52, 87 P. 2d 364 (1939).
"203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928). In People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177,
287 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1936), the same result was reached. This case is dis-
tinguishable, however, because the New York statutes declare that homicide is
"the killing of one human being by an act, procurement, or omission of another,"
N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1042 (Emphasis added), and that "the killing of a human
being . . . is murder in the first degree, when committed . . . by a person engaged
in the commission of, or in the attempt to commit a felony. . . ." N. Y. PEN.
LAW § 1044. (Emphasis added.)
In addition to New York eleven states (Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming) and the District of Columbia have statutes indicating a requirement
that one of the felons do the act causing death. Ohio and Wyoming statutes re-
quire that the act be done "purposely" as does the statute of the District of
Columbia, but in the last only in cases where the offence perpetrated is not one of
the enumerated felonies but any other act punishable by imprisonment.
" 381 Pa. 500. 113 A. 2d 464 (1955). The decision of the lower court, which
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on other grounds, is noted in 59
DICK. L. Rav. 183 (1955).
"1 Pennsylvania cases cited note 21 supra.
'2292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920).3 Id. at 300, 127 N. E. at 78.
24254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930).
"2 See note 29 supra.
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opinions both in the lower court86 and the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania
When a felon is killed by a non-felon
Therefore, the result in the principal case was reached under the
following status of the law: (a) controlling state authority on the possi-
bility of murder when a non-felon does the act causing death, but a split
of outside authority; (b) controlling state authority of the possibility
of murder when a felon is killed, but with all outside authority con-
trary; (c) absence of authority anywhere that a felon is guilty of murder
when his co-felon is justifiably killed by one attempting to prevent the
commission of the felony.
Only through the proximate cause theory, that a felon is guilty
of murder if any death results from the commission of the felony, can
the holding in the principal case be justified. The decision is contrary
to the formerly well-established rule that the homicide must be in
furtherance of the felony.38  It cannot be justified on the ground that
the accused caused the deceased to be in a place of danger, for the de-
ceased voluntarily entered what he knew would be a dangerous under-
taking. Deterrance of criminal activity has been advanced as a justi-
fication of the decision. Whether general acceptance of the view of this
case would have an appreciable deterrent effect is doubtful.80 At any
rate, deterrence is a factor to be considered not by the court but by
the legislature.40
This proximate cause theory of Pennsylvania, applied in the principal
case, caused a man to be convicted of murder for a justifiable homicide
s'55 Lack. Jur. 213, 235 (1954).
7381 Pa. 500, 527, 113 A. 2d 464, 478 (1955).s See notes 15 and 16 supra.
"Certainty of punishment, rather than harshness, would seem to be the deterrent
factor in a situation such as this, and in all these cases the criminal is certain to
be punished for a felony if he gets caught. For a brief discussion of the deterrence
factor, see Ball, The Deterrence Concept in. Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIm. L.
347 (1955).
"O "With all the will in the world to wish otherwise, I can only see in the
Majority's Opinion an arbitrary exercise of power rising out of a zeal to combat
criminals, which zeal does not surpass that of the writer's. However, zeal must
be channeled into the ways of the law as written." Justice Musmanno (dis-
senting) in Commonwealth v. Thomas, - Pa. -, -, 117 A. 2d 204, 222 (1955).
"If it should be deemed essential to the public safety and security that felons
be made chargeable with murder for all deaths occurring in and about the perpetra-
tion of a felony ... the legislature should be looked to for appropriate exercise
of the State's sovereign police power to an end never yet legislatively enacted."
justice Jones (dissenting), Id. at -, 117 A. 2d at 221.
The 1955 Legislature of Wisconsin enacted a new criminal code which embodies
this proximate cause idea in the third degree murder statute: "Whoever in the
course of committing or attempting a felony causes the death of another human
being as a natural and proximate consequence of the commission of or attempt to
commit the felony, may be imprisoned not more than 15 years in excess of the max-
imum provided by law for the felony." Wis. CumI. CoDn § 940.03 (1955).
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and under circumstances in which the deceased should be considered to
have "assumed the risk" of the undertaking. This carries the affirmative
proximate cause idea to its logical conclusion and points out the inade-
quacy of this theory when applied as the sole criterion for establishing
the implied crime of felony-murder. The split decision in this case
shows a dissatisfaction within the court which has advanced the theory
most strongly.41
The use of affirmative proximate cause is not necessary for the ob-
taining of murder convictions when such ought to be obtained.42  If its
use is helpful in the understanding of what the law is doing in felony-
murder cases, such use should be limited to those cases where a person
trying to prevent a felony dangerous to human life accidentally kills
someone other than one of the felons.
JAMES P. CREws.
Damages-Loss of Profits-Standard of Certainty
Calling our attention to a much litigated area of damage law is the
case of Evergreen Amusement Corporation v. Milstead.1  The plaintiff
had contracted to perform the excavation for an outdoor theater, but
delayed completion two and one-half months beyond the date specified.
To the plaintiff's action to recover the agreed price for the job, the de-
fendant filed a counterclaim seeking damages for the lost profits caused
by the delay. The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow re-
covery of such profits holding them to be too speculative for the jury to
" The three dissenting judges based their dissents mainly on the fact that the
killing was justifiable, and thus concluded that no one, either legally or morally,
should have been held guilty of murder. This question involves to some extent
a consideration of the wording of the Pennsylvania statute. "All murder ...
which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930). It was an obvious begging of
the question if such wording was meant to declare certain killings murder. All
such a statute can do is raise certain murders to first degree murder. Whether
or not the killing is murder depends on the common law definition.
In thirteen states (Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming) and
the District of Columbia, some form of the word "kill" is used instead of "mur-
der"; thus these statutes are definitive in nature. The same is true in Alabama,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, where "homicide is used. The Wisconsin
statute refers to causing the death. The rest of the felony-murder statutes are like
Pennsylvania's in using "murder."
"
2 A casual polling of laymen has revealed no one who felt that the defendant in
this case ought to be considered a murderer. The principal case deals with a set of
facts never previously considered in a reported decision in the United States.
Appeal would follow automatically on such an unsettled issue if prosecution were
brought. It would be absurd to say that a similar set of facts never existed be-
fore. The reason for failure to prosecute for murder in such a case must be the
failure on the part of the states' officials to consider it appropriate, or even to
consider it at all.
1206 Md. 610, 112 A. 2d 901 (1955).
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assess. A fair rental value of the theater property was allowed as an
alternative remedy.2
Denial of recovery for lost profits is commonly based on the court's
determination that such profits are too uncertain and speculative. The
general rule for recovering any damages is that the plaintiff must show
that he has suffered a loss and must show to a reasonable certainty the
nature and extent of the loss. 3 On this reasoning the early American
courts refused recovery for lost profits altogether, but the present view is
to allow such a recovery if the loss is the natural result of the defendant's
wrong, and the loss is not uncertain or speculative. 4
The North Carolina story has not been unique. Attempts to recover
damages for lost profits have arisen frequently in two situations: in-
terference in the cultivation of agricultural crops and interference with
business enterprises. At the risk of generalizing, it may be said that
the early North Carolina Court denied recovery in both instancesYz
Representative of the early view in respect to crops is the case of
Roberts v. Cole. The court refused plaintiff's attempt to recover antici-
pated profits stating that what the crop would have been worth was
"purely and wholly speculative." This reasoning was followed in a later
case where the rice seed, which defendant had sold the plaintiff, failed
to sprout. The court stated: ". . . [W]e have concluded, after mature
reflection and a careful study . . . that the principle ... in Roberts v.
Cole applies. ... -7 It is interesting to note that only two years later
the court in Herring v. Armwoods did allow recovery of damages for lost
profits where the defendant breached his contract to fertilize the soil.
2 The decision turned on the fact that the lost profits sought were for a new
business as distingiushed from an established business where damages could be
more certainly determined by assessing lost profits on the basis of previous earnings.
1 SEGDWIcic, DAMAGES § 170 (9th ed. 1920).
'25 C. J. S., DAMAGES § 41 (1941).
However, there has always been an alternative remedy. In the case of crops
it is normally the fair rental value of the land under cultivation, plus the plaintiff's
expenditures frustrated by the defendant's wrong. Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230,
37 S. E. 217 (1900). In the case of lost profits for business enterprise, the alterna-
tive remedy is normally the legal interest on the capital investment which is made
unproductive by the defendant's wrong. Foard v. Atlantic and North Carolina
R. R, 53 N. C. 235 (1860). Of course, the defendant has the right to prove that
the plaintiff did minimize his damages or had reasonable opportunity to do so.
Reiger v. Worth, supra (crops) and Jones v. Call, 96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647
(1887) (business).
682 N. C. 293 (1880).
Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230, 236, 37 S. E. 217, 219 (1900). In this de-
cision the court made no mention of the earlier case of Spencer v. Hamilton,
113 N. C. 49, 18 S. E. 167 (1893) where the plaintiff was allowed recovery for
the lessening of his net yield by the defendant's failure to maintain adequate ditches
as he had contracted to do.
8 130 N. C. 177, 41 S. E. 96 (1902). The court did not discuss the dcision in
the Reiger case, note 7 supra, but based its decision on the Spencer case, note 7
supra. Doubtless the court was influenced by the character of the defendants'
wrongs; however, its reasoning was based solely on the issue of certainty.
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Since the Herring decision the rule has become well established that the
value of the lost crop may be recovered. But the plaintiff has the
burden of provilg what the crop would have been worth but for the
defendant's wrong. Where the only evidence as to the anticipated value
of the crop was plaintiff's testimony as to what he thought it would have
been, the court denied recovery. 10 And where the plaintiff merely made
a comparison of the crop yield of one year with that of another the court
denied recovery, but in so doing enumerated some of the evidence which
should have been presented. 1  The recent case of Perry v. Doub12 re-
flects the court's present liberal view on the recovery of lost profits for
damage to crops.'3 Interestingly enough, the plaintiff had based his
claim for loss of profits on the defendant's breach of contract to loan
money, thus preventing a maximum crop production.14
The liberal trend of the court in allowing recovery for lost profits
where the plaintiff's crop has been damaged has also characterized the
court's reaction to attempts for recovery of lost profits in business ven-
tures. Where there was an existing contract calling for short term per-
formance by the plaintiff, loss of anticipated profits was allowed as the
measure of damages. Thus, where defendant reneged on his agreement
to allow plaintiff to grind his corn at a profit of three cents per bushel,
the court allowed the loss of such profits. 15 And where a contract called
for the manufacture and sale of certain machinery from which plaintiff
expected to make twelve hundred dollars profit, the court allowed re-
covery of that amount.16 Other cases have allowed similar recoveries. 1 7
' Gulley v. Raynor, 185 N. C. 96, 116 S. E. 171 (1928); Perry v. Kime, 169
N. C. 540, 86 S. E. 337 (1915).
10 Gulley v. Raynor, 185 N. C. 96, 116 S. E. 171 (1928).
"1 Perry v. Kime, 169 N. C. 540, 86 S. E. 337 (1915). "The character of the
soil and its condition; the kind of seed used, when planted and how; the prepara-
tion of the soil for planting; the quality of fertilizer, the quantity and the time and
manner of its application; the cultivation of the crop; the harvesting of the crop;
the seasons, and other circumstances enter into the estimate of what ought to be
made. .. "12238 N. C. 233, 77 S. E. 2d 711 (1953).
1 Counsel should be wary, however, when the claim for lost profits is based
on inferior fertilizer purchased from a fertilizer company. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 106-50.7 (4) (1952) proscribes the bringing of any action for damages based
on inferior fertilizer purchased from a fertilizer company, except where enumerated
requirements are met. These statutory requirements are so numerous and so
technical that the bringing of such actions is virtually barred. However, where
the farmer-defendant gave his promissory notes for the purchase price of fer-
tilizer the statute did not prevent his defense of failure of consideration based
on faulty fertilizer in an action by the payee-plaintiff. Swift & Co. v. Aydlett,
192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926).
"' The general rule seems to be that the normal damage for breach of contract
to loan money is the difference that plaintiff would have had to pay in interest and
expenses under the contract and that paid for a similar loan elsewhere. Mc-
CORMICK, DAMAGES § 139 (1935).
1 Oldham v. Kerchner, 79 N. C. 106 (1878).1 0 Jones v. Call, 96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).
Recovery for anticipated profits from accommodating tourists with a pleasure
boat which defendant had contracted for hire. Mace v. Ramsey, 74 N. C. 11
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Where no such contract existed and the plaintiff sought recovery
for the anticipated general profits of his business, the early North Caro-
lina Court denied them as too speculative. In Boyle v. Reeder'8 the
defendant failed to deliver certain machinery on the agreed date. The
court clearly expressed its aversion to the plaintiff's attempt to recover
his lost profits: "Very certainly, damages are not to be measured by
any such vague and indeterminate notion of anticipated and fancied
profits of a business or adventure which depends so much on skill experi-
ence, good management and good luck for success." ' A clear contrast
of lost profits in the "existing contract" category and the "general
profits" category is found in Jones v. Call.20 The plaintiff was allowed
the lost profits expected from existing contracts but was denied any
recovery for the expected profits on the "continued manufacture and
sale" of machinery. A more recent case refused the plaintiff's attempt
to recover the lost profits anticipated from the operation of a barber-
shop.21
Without belaboring a summary of the intervening case law22 one may
find the present viewpoint of the court as to lost business profits in
Perkins v. Langdon23s where an oral agreement between the parties
provided that the defendant would lease a tobacco warehouse to the
plaintiff for three market seasons. The defendant refused to continue
the lease after the first season and the plantiff's action sought recovery
for his lost prospective profits. Recovery was allowed based on the pe-
culiarly favorable evidence for meeting the certainty standard: govern-
ment control of tobacco crops, stabilization of tobacco prices by fixing
floor prices of all grades of tobacco, and statutory requirements for main-
taining accurate sales records.24  This commendable decision should
lead in the future to the court's according greater weight to sound
economic data for purposes of meeting the certainty standard.
Although the American courts have liberalized their views in allow-
(1876); plaintiff recovered $27,000, the expected profits from the manufacture
and sale of cell doors for the state penitentiary. Clements v. State, 77 N. C. 142
(1877).1823 N. C. 607 (1841).
19 Id. at 614.
2096 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).21Brewington v. Loughran, 183 N. C. 558, 112 S. E. 257 (1922).
-z Other, but not all, similar North Carolina decisions are: Foard v. Atlantic
and North Carolina R. R., 53 N. C. 235 (1860) ; Winston Cigarette Machine Co.
v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 141 N. C. 284, 53 S. E. 885 (1906) ; Thompson
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 165 N. C. 377, 81 S. E. 315 (1914) ; Reliable Trucking
Co. v. Payne, 233 N. C. 637, 68 S. E. 2d 288 (1951).23237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953).
2 Notice that the action was brought after the expiration date agreed upon in
the lease. The evidence relied upon to meet the certainty standard would not have
been available had the action been brought immediately upon the defendant's
breach. Plaintiffs might be well advised to delay suit in order to accumulate the
necessary evidence to support their claims for lost profits.
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ing recovery for lost profits there still remains a standard of certainty
to be met. It is significant that this standard is not applied in other
areas of damage law.25  Recognizing the speculative character of the
plaintiff's claim, courts nevertheless allow the claim as the measure of
damage, for instance, loss of consortium, 26 invasion of privacy,27 and im-
pairment of an infant's earning capacity after he reaches his majority.28
No decisions have undertaken to analyze the rationale for applying the
standard in some instances and not applying it in others. Justification
that the standard restrains excessive verdicts is hardly valid, since the
remittitur safeguard would be equally effective for lost profits as it
would for personal injury claims. Quaere whether such a restraint is
necessary.29  It has been suggested that the availability of alternative
remedies motivates the courts' application of the standard in actions for
lost profits.30 But the alternative remedies do not necessarily achieve
the purpose of money damages, making the plaintiff whole. Some
justification might be found in the business-plaintiff's ability to offset his
injury through additional efforts for profits, as contrasted with the
usual inability of the personally injured plaintiff to do so. A broader
reason could be urged that the policy of spreading the loss can be
effectuated through the business-plaintiff's own efforts, whereas in the
case of the personally injured plaintiff, the aid of the court is needed.
These conjectures can be nothing more than rationalizations for the
now well-entrenched standard of certainty.
According to one authority the extensive use of the certainty standard
is a peculiar American contribution to damage law.31 This being true
" "In the tort field, it has in fact no application at all to the measurement of
damages to interest of personality, such as claims for pain, mental anguish, or
humiliation, nor, of course, to punitive damages." MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 32,
p. 124 (1935).
21 "The value of such loss must be determined by the triers of fact in the
exercise of a sound discretion in the light of their own experience, observation
and reflection." Gist v. French, 288 P. 2d 1003, 1009 (Cal. App., 1955).
27 "The measure of damages therefore is for the trier of fact, and in assessing
such damages he is accorded a wide and elastic discretion." Fairfield v. American
Photocopy Equipment Co., 291 P. 2d 194, 198 (Cal. App., 1955).
28 "... [I~t is clear enough . . . that a finding of impaired earning capacity
afterwards would have been nothing more substantial than a mere speculation ...
[T]he law furnishes no measure of damages other than the enlightened conscience
of impartial jurors, guided by all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case." Birmingham Electric Co. v. Cleveland, 216 Ala. 455, 459, 113 So. 403, 406
(1927).
2" By the very nature of the claim, the plaintiff will ordinarily be a corporation
or other type of business association. It is common knowledge that this type
party defendant is jeopardized in accident litigation merely because of what it is.
Would it not follow that a jury's sentiments would be against awarding excessive
verdicts to that type plaintiff?
"oNote, 64 HAiv. L. Rv. 317, 324 (1950).
$' McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §§ 25, 26 (1935): "This elaboration of the doctrines
relating to the standard of 'certainty,' . . .is a by-product of the jury System,
springing from the lack of confidence of American judges in the discretion of
juries."
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the standard will probably enjoy a long and productive career in our
country. But realizing the enhancement of the economy by business' re-
liance and action on anticipated gains, the courts should continue to
liberalize the requirements for satisfying the standard. This may be
accomplished without invading the principles involved by an increased
reliance on available economic data and a more sympathetic attitude
towards efforts for progress and achievement.
RICHMOND BERNHARDT, JR.
Evidence-The Dead Man's Statute-Personal Transaction
In the recent case of Hardison v. Gregory' the North Carolina
Supreme Court once again had before it the problem of deciding whether
a particular fact situation constituted a "personal transaction or com-
munication" between an interested witness and a deceased person under
N. C. G. S. § 8-51, commonly referred to as "the dead man's statute."'2
It should be noted that the statute does not disqualify all witnesses
or all testimony. A very good analysis of the statute was made by Jus-
tice Ervin in the case of Peek v. Shook3 as follows:
"This statute does not render the testimony of a witness in-
competent unless these four questions require an affirmative
answer:
"1. Is the witness (a) a party to the action, or (b) a person
interested in the event of the action,4 or (c) a person from,
through or under whom such a party or interested person derives
his interest or title?
1242 N. C. 324, 82 S. E. 2d 96 (1955). See Case Law Survey, 34 N. C. L.
REv. 53 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51. "Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon
the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a person interested in the event,
or a person from, through or under whom such a party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title, by assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or person, or the committee of a lunatic, or the person
deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person or lunatic,
by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction or communication
between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except where the executor,
administrator, survivor, committee or person deriving title or interest is examined
in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in
evidence concerning the same transaction or communication."
Exclusionary statutes of this type are in effect in all but three states: Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. In New Mexico, Oregon and Vir-
ginia, the interested party may testify, but his testimony uncorroborated is in-
sufficient to support a recovery. 2 WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 578 (3rd ed. 1940).
233 N. C. 259, 63 S. E. 2d 542 (1951). See also: Bunn v. Todd, 107 N. C.
266, 11 S. E. 1043 (1890) and STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 66 (1946).
' "The interest which determines the competency of a witness under the statute
is a present direct pecuniary interest." Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 61, 69
S. E. 2d 156, 160 (1952). See also: Price v. Askins; 212 N. C. 583, 194 S. E. 284
(1937) ; Burton v. Styers, 210 N. C. 230, 186 S. E. 248 (1936) ; In re Gorham, 177
N. C. 271, 98, S. E. 717 (1919).
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"2. Is the witness testifying (a) in his own behalf or interest,
or (b) in behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest?
"3. Is the witness testifying against (a) the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased person, or (b) the committee of a lunatic,
or (c) a person deriving his title or interest from, through or
under a deceased person or lunatic?
"4. Does the testimony of the witness concern a personal
transaction or communication between the witness and the de-
ceased person or lunatic?
"Even in the instances where these four things occur, the
testimony of the witness is nevertheless admissible under the ex-
ception specified in the statute itself if the personal representative
of the deceased person, or the committee of the lunatic, or the
person deriving his title or interest from, through, or under the
deceased person or lunatic is examined on his own behalf, or the
testimony of the deceased person or lunatic is given in evidence
concerning the same transaction or communication." 5
The basic reason for the rules laid down by the statute seems to be
to prevent fraud, the idea being that since the deceased person is no
longer able to testify as to what happened or what was said, it would
be easy for the living party to give false testimony without fear of con-
tradiction. "Death having closed the mouth of the deceased, the law
closed the mouth of the other except only where the personal representa-
tive of the deceased opens up the matter by testifying himself or
putting in the testimony of the deceased." 6
It has been stated that "courts are not disposed to extend the dis-
qualification of a witness under the statute to those not included in its
express terms."17 Testimony as to any matter other than a transaction
or communication with the deceased is not prohibited by the statute ;' nor
is testimony as to transactions or communications with third persons
prohibited even though they may involve or throw light upon transac-
tions with deceased persons since the third persons, being disinterested,
can be called to contradict any misstatement. ° Testimony of an inter-
ested witness on behalf or in favor of the deceased person is not pro-
1233 N. C. at 261, 63 S. E. 2d at 543.
'Sutton v. Wells, 175 N. C. 1, 4, 94 S. E. 688, 689 (1917). See also: Hall
v. Holloman, 136 N. C. 35, 48 S. E. 516 (1904) ; McCanless v. Reynolds, 74 N. C.
301 (1875).
Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 59, 69 S. E. 2d 156, 158 (1952); Hardison v.
Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 327, 88 S. E. 2d 96, 98 (1955).
' In re the Will of Bowling, 150 N. C. 507, 64 S. E. 368 (1909) ; Whitesides
v. Green, 64 N. C. 307 (1870).
' Watts v Warren, 108 N. C. 514, 13 S. E. 232 (1890); Bunn v. Todd, 107
N. C. 266, 11 S. E. 1043 (1890) ; Cary v. Cary, 104 N. C. 175, 10 S. E. 156 (1889).
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hibited;10 nor does G. S. § 8-51 prevent an interested party who is
merely an observer from testifying as to acts of the deceased-i.e., as
to independent facts based upon independent knowledge, not derived
from any personal transaction or communication with the deceased.,-
In the principal case the plaintiff, in an action for criminal conversa-
tion and alienation of affections dgainst the co-administrators of the
deceased, was allowed to testify, over the objections of the defendants,
that he had: (1) walked into his own house at night and found the
deceased standing in his living room close to the door of the bedroom
in which his wife was dressing; (2) seen the deceased and his wife leave
a cabin owned by the deceased and drive off in the deceased's Cadillac
car; (3) looked through the window of deceased's office and seen the
deceased hugging and kissing his wife; and (4) seen the deceased and
his wife come out of a cabin and get into deceased's Cadillac, chased
them, knocked out the windows of the car with a hatchet, and struck
the deceased with the hatchet.
The court held that the testimony relating to what the witness had
seen the deceased do was competent "because he was testifying to inde-
pendent facts based upon independent knowledge, not derived from any
personal transaction or communication with the deceased."1 2 This much
of the holding is certainly in accord with previous decisions in North
Carolina' 3 and in other jurisdictions.' 4 However, the court disagreed as
to the admissibility of the testimony in regard to the action of the plain-
tiff in breaking the windows of the car and hitting the deceased in the
face with a hatchet. The majority held that this was admissible as testi-
mony of independent acts, while the concurring judges15 considered this
as testimony concerning a "personal transaction" between the plaintiff
and the deceased.
Exactly what may or may not constitute a "personal transaction"
under any given set of facts is often hard to determine. The courts have
been reluctant to formulate any specific criteria which could be followed
consistently and apparently have ben satisfied to deal with each situation
as the problem arose. However, the court has said, "we think a fair test
'0 Reece v. Woods, 180 N. C. 631, 105 S. E. 337 (1920) ; Seals v. Seals, 165
N. C. 409, 81 S. E. 613 (1914); McFarland v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
188 Wash. 357, 62 P. 2d 714 (1936).
" Wilder v. Medlin, 215 N. C. 542, 2 S. E. 2d 549 (1939) ; Worth v. Wrenn,
144 N. C. 656, 57 S. E. 388 (1907); Costen v. McDowell, 107 N. C. 546, 12 S. E.
432 (1889) ; McCall v. Wilson, 101 N. C. 598, 8 S. E. 225 (1888).
12 242 N. C. at 329, 88 S. E. 2d at 99.
3 See note 11 supra.
1" Stiff v. Cobb, 126 Ala. 381, 28 So. 402 (1900) ; First Nat. Bank v. Warner,
17 N. D. 76, 114 N. W. 1085 (1908) ; Hanson v. Fiesler, 49 S. D. 442, 207 N. W.
449 (1926).
" Three judges concurred in the result because the same facts were testified
to by a witness for the defendants.
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in undertaking to ascertain what is a 'personal transaction or communi-
cation' with the deceased about which the other party to it cannot testify
is to inquire whether, in case the witness testify falsely as to what
transpired between them, the deceased, if living, could contradict it of
his own knowledge" ;16 and, "the transactions contemplated by the statute
and concerning which a party to an action is prohibited from being
examined on his own behalf against the administrator of the deceased
person are such transactions as are essential and material links in the
chain establishing liability against the estate of such deceased person."'17
Specifically, courts have held that testimony concerning "personal
transactions" includes testimony as to the following: money due on
contract,18 the existence of a partnership,19 marriage,20 delivery of writ-
ten instruments or other objects, 21 and performance of personal serv-
ices.22 Also, it has been held that the statute applies to actions in tort
as well as on contract.23  Among the tort situations which have been
included within the statute as "personal transactions" are: accidents in-
volving automobiles, 24 malpractice, 25 and assault.
26
1 White v. Evans, 188 N. C. 212, 213, 124 S. E. 194, 194 (1924). See also:
Yuritch v. Yuritch, 139 N. J. Eq. 439, 51 A. 2d 901 (1947) ; Tallman v. First Nat.
Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 208 P. 2d 302 (1950) ; Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C 396,
42 S. E. 2d 468 (1948); Sherrill v. Wilhelm, 182 N. C. 673, 110 S. E. 95 (1921);
In re Wind's Estate, 27 Wash. 2d 421, 178 P. 2d 731 (1947).
" Davis v. Pearson, 220 N. C. 163, 165, 16 S. E. 2d 655, 656 (1941). See also:
Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934).V8 George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 Pac. 73 (1915) ; Stanton v. Helm,
87 Miss. 287, 39 So. 457 (1905); McMichael v. Pegram, 225 N. C. 400, 35 S. E.
2d 174 (1945).
" Wingler v. Miller, 223 N. C. 15, 25 S. E. 2d 160 (1943) ; Gage v. Phillips,
21 Nev. 150, 26 Pac. 60 (1891). Contra: Turner v. Huggins, 130 Tenn. 181, 169
S. W. 754 (1914).
"' "If marriage is not a personal transaction between the contracting parties,
what is it?" Hopkins v. Bowers, 111 N. C. 175, 179, 16 S. E. 1, 2 (1892). See
also: Smith v. Smith, 187 Ga. 743, 2 S. E. 2d 417 (1939) ; Catlett v. Chestnut, 107
Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933); Berger v. Kirby, 105 Tex. 611, 153 S. W. 1130
(1913).
21 Hoag v. Wright, 174 N. Y. 36, 66 N. E. 579 (1903) ; Lane v. Rogers, 113
N. C. 171, 18 S. E. 117 (1893).
22 Davidson v. Barden, 139 N. C. 1, 51 S. E. 779 (1905) ; Gray v. Cooper, 65 N. C.
183 (1871) ; Pancoast v. Eldridge, 157 Okla. 195, 11 P. 2d 918 (1932). Contra:
Will of Fuller, 190 Wis. 445, 209 N. W. 683 (1926).
" Leavea v. Southern Ry., 266 Mo. 151, 181 S. W. 7, Annot. 1916D L. R. A.
810 (1915) ; Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934), commented on
in Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 230 (1934). Contra: Warfield Natural Gas Co. v.
Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S. W. 2d 21 (1934).
24 Chapman v. Bruton, Inc., 325 Ili. App. 324, 60 N. E. 2d 125 (1945) ; Wells v.
Wildin, 224 Iowa 913, 277 N. W. 308 (1938) ; -Fick v. Herman, 159 Neb. 758, 68
N. W. 2d 622 (1955); Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934);
Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733. 177 S. E. 878 (1935); Waters v. Markham,
204 Wis. 332, 235 N. W. 797 (1937). Contra: Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751,
102 S. W. 2d 552 (1937) ; Kinsella v. Meyer's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 508, 102 S. W. 2d
974 (1937); Rost v. Kessler, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 97 (1944). But see: Kilmer v.
Gustason, 211 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954) (Plaintiff permitted to testify only to his
om actions and movements of his own car.
2" Barnett v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461 (1915).
20 Southern v. Belleau, 203 Ky. 508, 262 S. W. 619 (1924); Maciejczak v.
Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P. 2d 31 (1936).
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It is apparent that any sort of action in which the deceased and the
witness are involved can be called a "personal transaction" if the court
so desires. At best, the distinction between what the court will hold
to be a "personal transaction" in one situation and what it will hold not
to be a "personal transaction" in another situation is very fine- and
ordinarily the scales of justice are balanced very heavily toward the pro-
tection of the deceased, thus causing the doubtful case to be resolved
against the surviving party.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the principal case, held that
the act of the plaintiff in chasing the deceased, knocking out his car
windows (with the deceased in the car with the doors locked), and
hitting the deceased in the head with a hatchet was "an independent act."
The court cited the cases of Boyd v. WilliaMs2 7 and Davis v. Pearson28
and held that both cases were inapplicable. "It would seem that the
ruling in these two cases was based on the fact that each plaintiff was a
passenger in the car."' The essence of the facts in these cases was
that the plaintiff was riding in a car with the deceased, and there was
an accident in which the plaintiff was injured. In both cases testimony
of the plaintiffs was ruled incompetent on the ground that it involved a
personal transaction with a deceased person under G. S. § 8-51. The
plaintiffs in these cases were not even allowed to testify that the de-
ceaseds were driving at the time of the accident or to testify as to any
facts that might indicate that they themselves were not driving.
The court in the principal case is obviously making a distinction
between acts done with a deceased person and acts done to such a per-
son, thereby placing an emphasis upon the "personal" relationship of the
parties. Acts done to a deceased apparently are considered "independ-
ent acts," and not within the statutory exclusion. In the automobile
cases, the testimony of the survivor relates to facts and circumstances
of which he had knowledge because of his "personal" relationship with
the deceased; while in the principal case, it could be said that there was
no "personal" relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased.
Although there is a distinction with regard to the relationship of the
parties in these cases (and thus with regard to the "personal" aspect of
the phrase "personal transaction"), there is no such logical distinction
as to the facts of each situation which constitutes the "transaction." It
would seem that neither situation involves a "transaction." In a case
involving a collision between an automobile and a truck, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas stated, "Such is not the usual, common, or ordinarily
accepted meaning of the word 'transaction.' The word is defined: 'A
!!"207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934).28220 N. C. 163, 16 S. E. 2d 655 (1941).
"Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 329, 88 S. E. 2d 96, 99 (1955).
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business deal; an act involving buying and selling; as the transactions
on the exchange. Its synonym is negotiation.' (Webster's New Inten-
national Dictionary, Second Edition). ' '3°
It would seem that the reasoning used by the North Carolina Court
in the principal case, in view of the normally accepted understanding of
the wording used in the "dead man's statute," is not in keeping with the
better reasoned interpretation of the statute. However, the holding of
the Court is a good one in view of the modern trend toward the admissi-
bility of evidence. It would seem that this holding is in keeping with the
normally accepted understanding of the wording of the statute and that
the holdings in the previously cited automobile cases distorted the intent
of the statute.
DONALD LEON MOORE.
Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights, Constitutional
Law, and the Grand jury
The Louisiana code provides that a challenge to the array of a grand
jury must be made "before the expiration of the third judicial day of
the term for which said grand jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering upon the trial of the case if it be sooner. . . ."' In the recent
case of Poret v. LouisianaP this statute was involved. There, one of
the defendants, Poret, fled the state after the consummation of the
offense and remained outside the jurisdiction until one and one half
years after the termination of the term of the grand jury which indicted
him. At arraignment on October 27, 1952, assisted by his own counsel,
he pleaded not guilty and was granted additional time to file a motion
for severance. On November 7, 1952, after denial of his motion for
severance, he moved-for the first time-to quash the indictment be-
cause of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury. The
trial court denied the motion, after finding that defendant was a fugitive
from justice, on the ground that it was filed more than a year and a half
too late. The Supreme Courts of Louisiana 3 and of the United States
4
affirmed, the latter on three grounds. First, the court considered the
defendant as having forfeited his right to challenge by his own action in
voluntarily fleeing. Second, even after having returned to the state he
"' Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 753, 102 S. W. 552, 553 (1937).
'Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 92 (1955). The phrase "third judicial
day of the term" has been interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court to mean
"the third judicial day following the term." State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 So.
2d 873 (1943).
350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Poret v. State, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 2d 207 (1954).
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36 (1896).
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did not object at the first opportunity.5 Third, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state may attach reasonable
time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights. The
majority, through Justice Clark, stated:
"We do not believe that the mere fugitive status existing here
excuses a failure to resort to Louisiana's established statutory
procedure available to all who wish to assert claimed consti-
tutional rights. This is not to say that the act of fleeing and be-
coming a fugitive deprives one of federal rights. We hold only
that due regard for the fair as well as effective administration of
criminal justice gives the State a legitimate interest in requiring
reasonable attacks on its inquisitorial process and that the present
case is not one in which this interest must bow to essential con-
siderations of fairness to individual defendants." [Emphasis
added.]
Justice Black, dissenting, with whom Justice Douglas and the Chief
justice concurred, declared:
"Under our system even a bad man is entitled to have his case
considered at every stage by a fair tribunal. ' 7
Justice Douglas, dissenting, with whom Justice Black and the Chief
Justice concurred, stated:
"But it is dangerous doctrine to deprive a man of his consti-
tutional rights in one case for his wrongful conduct in another.
That is a doctrine that currently is gaining momentum. . . . I
would give every accused, regardless of his record ...the full
benefit of the constitutional guarantees of due process."
A similar case is Daniels v. Allen,9 considered along with a group
of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court under the title of
Brown v. Allen.10 Petitioners objected to the systematic exclusion of
Negroes from the grand jury at trial. The trial court granted them 60
days in which to appeal. On the 60th day counsel called the prosecuting
attorney's office to serve him, but he was out of town for the weekend.
Thus service was made on Monday, the 61st day, after the prosecuting
attorney had returned to his office. The state supreme court granted
the prosecuting attorney's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
6 Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 98 (1955).
'Id. at 104.
'Id. at 105-06.
344 U. S. 443, 484 (1952). For the North Carolina Supreme Court's treatment
of this case prior to the appeal to the United States Supreme Court see State v.
Daniels, 231 N. C. 17, 56 S. E. 2d 2 (1949).
10344 U. S. 443, 484 (1952). See Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 185 (1946) and
N. C. GEx. STAT. § 9-1 (1953).
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that the notice was one day late, and the court refused to consider the
appeal on its merits. The United States Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the state furnished an adequate and easily complied-with
method of appeal, and that habeas corpus should not be a substitute for
appeal. Justice Black, dissenting, stated:
"Although admittedly the [North Carolina] court had discre-
tionary authority to hear the appeal, it dismissed the case. Pe-
titioners were thereby prevented from arguing the point of racial
discrimination and consequently it has never been passed on by
an appellate court. This denial of state appellate review plus the
obvious racial discrimination thus left uncorrected should be
enough to make one of those 'extraordinary situations' which the
Court says authorizes federal courts to protect the constitutional
rights of state prisoners."'"
The United States Supreme Court indicated in Frisbie v. Collins'2
that "special circumstances" may justify federal entry in a case where
prompt federal intervention is required. Obviously, the Supreme Court
did not think that "special circumstances" were present in the Poret
and Brown cases, although in both cases systematic exclusion of Negroes
from the grand jury was apparent. Also, several defendants were facing
execution.
Justice Black, dissenting, in the Brown case declared:
"The court thinks that to review this question and grant peti-
tioners the protections guaranteed by the Constitution would
'subvert the entire system of state criminal justice and destroy
state energy in the detection and punishment of crime.' I cannot
agree. State systems are not so feeble."'18
Thus it seems that a dominant consideration of the majority in both
cases is the idea of maintaining a balance between state and federal
power. Also, the majority, for a test, looked only at the reasonableness
of the state regulation, and not at the way the regulation affected the
respective petitioners.'4
Illustrative of the ability of the court to reach an opposite con-
clusion with the "reasonableness test" is Reece v. Georgia,15 decided
2' Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 553 (1952).
12342 U. S. 519, 521 (1951).
18 Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 553 (1952).
"Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 93 (1955): 'We do not find that this
requirement on its face raises an insuperable barrier to one making claim to
federal rights. The test is whether the defendant had 'reasonable opportunity
to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined' by the State
Court." See alsa Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U. S. 314 (1947) and Parker v. Illinois,
333 U. S. 571 (1948).
18350 U. S. 85 (1955).
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the same day as the Poret case. There the state regulation provided
that challenge to the composition of the grand jury must be made
before indictment. The defendant was arrested three days before,
and attorneys were not appointed to defend him until one day after, his
indictment. Five days after appointment counsel moved to quash the
indictment on the ground that Negroes had been systematically excluded
from the grand jury. The motion was overruled, and the state supreme
court affirmed.16 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
the regulation unconstitutional, saying through Justice Clark:
"But it is utterly unrealistic to say that he had such opportunity
when counsel was not provided for him until the day after he was
indicted .... Georgia should have considered Reece's motion to
quash on its merits."17
Compare that statement with the statement of Justice Douglas in his
dissent in the Poret case:
"The opportunity to raise the constitutional objection, therefore,
was foreclosed before he was arraigned and, as far as the record
shows, before he had any knowledge that the indictment was
pending against him. It is as if the grand jury had been im-
paneled before the commission of the offense, and the time for
raising objections to it expired with the impaneling, as was the
case of Carter v. State of Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 20 S. Ct. 687, 689,
55 L. Ed. 839. Under these circumstances Poret had no real
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the composition
of the grand jury."' 8
Justice Clark in the Reece case cited and relied upon the Carter case
as authority, saying:
"In the present case as in Carter, the right to object to a grand
jury presupposes an opportunity to exercise that right."'u
It should be noted that both the majority and minority in the Poret case
relied on many of the same cases, and Justice Clark in the Reece case
relied on some of the same cases as the minority in the Poret case. One
great difficulty in ascertaining what the law is on this subject is made
manifest by the fact that the same cases can be relied on as authority for
opposite conclusions.
In the Reece case nothing was said about counsel's failure to raise
the federal question at the first opportunity. It should be emphasized
" Reece v. State, 211 Ga. 339, 85 S. E. 2d 773 (1955).7 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 89 (1955).
" Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 105 (1955).
"Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 89 (1955).
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that counsel did not raise the point until five days after appointment,
the exact number of days that the court held too late, as not made at
the first opporunity, in Agnew v. United States.20 The court neverthe-
less thought that the federal right should be protected, so the state
regulation was declared unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. In
Michel v. Louisiana ,21 considered along with the Poret case, there was
a misunderstanding between the trial court and counsel as to exactly
when counsel was appointed, whether when the trial court orally
appointed counsel in open court or when he received formal notice of
appointment some three days later. The trial court considered him ap-
pointed as of the time of the oral appointment, and a motion to quash
the indictment because of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
grand jury was denied because it was four days too late, it being made
seven days after oral appointment and four days after formal appoint-
ment. Despite the misunderstanding, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed, accepting the trial court's theory that counsel was appointed as
of the time of oral appointment in open court and stating that a motion
to quash is a short, simple document, easily prepared in a single after-
noon. It is true that a motion to quash could easily be prepared in a
single afternoon, but to investigate and collect evidence concerning
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury, so as to warrant
preparation of such a motion, might take a considerable amount of time.
No matter at which time one considers counsel to have been appointed in
the Michel case, the motion was made not later than two days after the
motion in the Reece case. If one takes the view that counsel was not
empowered to act until his formal appointment, the motion was made
one day sooner than the motion in the Reece case.
The distinction does not seem clear. Apparently, the court thought
that the Louisiana regulation did not raise "an insuperable barrier to
one making claim to federal rights,122 whereas it thought that the regu-
lation in the Reece case did. Counsel in the Poret case did not file his
motion to quash until twelve days after he was employed by Poret, and
the court held this too late, either with or without regard to the Louisi-
ana statute.
Aside from the position taken by the majority in the Poret case that
the Louisiana statute was objectively reasonable; the decision seems to
be based upon the voluntary flight of Poret. What, then, are the rights
generally of one who evades the law by fleeing?
Generally, the law is rather harsh to persons who evade it, as is
illustrated by the Poret case. A fleeing felon in North Carolina may
be declared an outlaw, and any person can arrest him, or slay him if
20165 U. S. 36 (1896). 21350 U. S. 91 (1955).
-- See note 14 supra.
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necessary.23 If he flees the state he may lose his state citizenship and
his right to personal property exemptions.24  If before trial, he simply
flees, within or without the state, he loses his right to a speedy trial ;25
he may be denied a continuance for the purpose of obtaining witnesses,
the rationale being that he did not use proper diligence ;26 and the statute
of limitations is suspended.27 If defendant flees after trial his appeal
will be dismissed or his case left off the docket,28 unless he is in actual29
or constructive3 0 custody at the time of the consideration of the appeal.
It would seem that an austere stand may be justified where the defendant
has already been tried and found guilty and then flees. But it seems that
the court is not justified in saying that he has lost some substantial right
where he flees prior to trial. As was pointed out in Hickory v. United
States:
"A person however conscious of innocence might not have
courage to stand trial, but might, although innocent, think it
necessary to consult his safety by flight."3'
Where the defendant has fled, upon being tried he may find that
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1953). See State v. Stancill, 128 N. C. 606, 611-12,
38 S. E. 926, 928 (1901) for vindicative language by Justice Cook: "So care-
ful is the law to protect those who have not been tried and convicted that the
'outlaws' are entitled to be 'called upon and warned to surrender' before they are
allowed to be slain."
2" Cromer y. Self, 149 N. C. 164, 62 S. E. 885 (1908). See N. C. GEN. STAT.§§ 15-55 to -84 (1953) and Notes, 10 N. C. L. Rzv. 292 (1931), 11 N. C. L. Rlv.
163 (1932), 15 N. C. L. REv. 343, 344 (1936), 41 HARV. L. REv. 74 (1927) and
31 MINx. L. Rav. 699 (1047) on extradition.
2 Chelf v. State, 223 Ind. 70, 58 N. E. 2d 353 (1945); McGuire v. Wallace,
109 Ind. 284, 10 N. E. 111 (1887).
"' Hubbard v. State, 65 Neb. 805, 91 N. W. 869 (1902) ; see Stevens v. State,
49 S. W. 105 (Tex. Cr. App. 1899) where a continuance for the co-defendant of
the fugitive was not granted because it was doubtful if the attendance of the
fugitive could be procured.
"' State v. Miller, 188 Mo. 370, 87 S. W. 484 (1905) ; In re Bruce, 132 Fed. 390(C. C. Md. 1904) (1904), aff'd in Bruce v. Bryan, 136 Fed. 1022 (C. C. Md.1905) ; State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d 860 (1942) ; Streep v. United
States, 160 U. S. 128 (1895).
28 Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189 (1949) ; Wood v. State, 61 S. W. 308(Tex. Cr. App. 1901) ; Harris v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 429, 224 S. W. 2d 427(1950) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543 (1867) held, that the fugi-
tive loses his right to be heard by counsel on appeal where he flees after trial.
29 Knight v. State, 190 Tenn. 326, 229 S. W. 2d 501 (1950). But see Savage v.
State, 174 P. 2d 272 (Okla. Cr. Rep. 1947) which held, that it is within the dis-
cretion of the Appellate Court to review where the prisoner voluntarily left the
state, and Bland v. State, 224 S. W. 2d 479 (Tex. Cr. App. 1950) which held,
that the appeal would be dismissed unless the prisoner could show good cause why
it should be reinstated even where the prisoner was then in actual custody.
The rationale of the rule seems to be that the court will not consider an appeal
of the defendant unless he can be made to respond to any judgment or order the
court may enter in the case. Kuyendall v. State, 168 P. 2d 142 (Okla. Cr. App.
1946). In State v. Cody, 119 N. C. 908. 26 S. E. 252, 56 Am. St. Rep. 692(1896) the convict had escaoed and had been at large for two years, and still
was at the time of the consideration of the appeal.
20 Peoole v. Cossey. 217 P. 2d 133 (Cal. Alpp. 1950).
21 160 U. S. 408, 418 (1895). This case has an excellent discussion on flight.
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his flight has created certain natural and non-legal presumptions against
him.32  Flight is usually easy to establish, and it is almost universally
present in crimes of violence. Flight in any direction,3 3 and for any
amount of time or any distance3 4 will warrant an instruction by the court
as to flight. Though flight alone is not sufficient to establish guilt,3 5 it is
a legitimate ground for the inference of guilt ;36 add to this his departure
immediately after the consummation of the offense, and his traveling
under aliases to avoid detection, and such is in itself evidence of guilt.37
As a matter of course, it is for the jury to determine the weight that is
to be given the evidence. 38 Where the state makes no contention that
defendant fled he cannot introduce evidence of voluntary surrender. 9
Although the offense be admitted,40 or the defendant voluntarily sur-
rendered,41 evidence of flight may nevertheless be admitted. Thus, it
seems that the state can always take advantage of flight, but that the
defendant cannot take advantage of voluntary surrender or a refusal to
flee 42 unless the state first enters evidence of flight, or the defendant vol-
untarily surrenders prior to an indictment being filed against him.43
Once evidence of flight is offered by the state, the defendant has the
right to explain away the flight by using any evidence consistent with
his innocence.44 Evidence of a willingness to surrender voluntarily45 is
admissible where a flight instruction is given, and, in such a caserthe
" "He who flees from trial confesses his guilt." PUBLILI SYRI, SENTENTIAE
30 (1870). "The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are bold
as a lion." Paovaaas 28:1.
" People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. App. 2d 231, 95 P. 2d 169 (1939). Defendant's
flight was from the presence of threatening police and not from the premises which
he was charged with looting.
" Hamby v. State, 71 Ga. App. 817, 32 S. E. 2d 546 (1945). After the shoot-
ing the defendant ran and was apprehended at home an hour later, not having fled
the community. Muse v. State, 29 Ala. App. 271, 196 So. 148, cert. denied 239
Ala. 557, 196 So. 151 (1940). Defendant "whirled and run" after taking the pocket
book and was apprehended the next day, not having left the city.
"Howard v. State, 182 Miss. 27, 181 So. 525 (1938).
" United States v. Heitner, 149 F. 2d 105, cert. denied 326 U. S. 727, rehearing
denied 326 U. S. 809 (1945) ; Bird v. United States, 187 U. S. 118 (1902) ; Allen
v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896).
"' People v. Peak, 66 Cal. App. 2d 894, 153 P. 2d 464 (1944) ; People v. Waller,
14 Cal. 2d 693, 96 P. 2d 344 (1939).
"State v. Torphy, 217 Ind. 383, 28 N. E. 2d 70 (1940).
Moyers v. State, 61 Ga. App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940) ; Starke v. State,31 Ala. App. 322, 16 So. 2d 426 (1944); Slappey v. State, 64 Ga. App. 713, 13
S. E. 2d 873 (1941).
"State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P. 2d 854 (1941).
,x People v. Reese, 65 Cal. App. 2d 329, 150 P. 2d 571 (1944).
"Moyers v. State, 61 Ga. App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940).
,People v. Martin, 380 Ill. 328, 44 N. R. 2d 49 (1942).
"Cavney v. State, 210 Ind. 455, 4 N. E. 2d 137 (1936) ; McAllister v. State,
30 Ala. App. 366, 6 So. 2d 32 (1942).
"'People v. Zammora, 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 152 P. 2d 819 (1942) ; Compton v.
State, 74 Okla. Cr. Rep. 48, 122 P. 2d 819 (1942); cf. Moyers v. State, 61 Ga.
App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940), which held, that it was not error to exclude
evidence that defendant did not flee after the robbery.
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court should instruct the jury as to the defendant's right to explain
his flight or absence. 46 If voluntary surrender is made before an indict-
ment is filed against the defendant, this overcomes any presumption of
guilt arising from the flight.47
Because there is usually movement by the offender away from the
scene of the crime, it seems that the state could introduce evidence of
flight in most cases, from which the jury could, and it seems invariably
would, draw an inference of guilt. To overcome this inference, the
defendant must come forward with an explanation or suffer the risk of
"non-persuasion." A maxim of the law is that a person is presumed
innocent until proved guilty. For practical purposes, this maxim is
rendered nugatory when evidence is admitted that the defendant "sud-
denly left town," for this places upon him the heavy burden of explana-
tion.
The Poret case is another decision which treated the fleeing felon
with harshness, but unlike the state and federal cases just referred to,
it considered the defendant's flight in conjunction with a denial of federal
constitutional rights in a state criminal prosecution. Though there may
be strong reasons for an unsympathetic attitude toward the fleeing felon,
this does not justify being extremely technical or vindictive when there
are serious showings that he was denied some substantial or constitu-
tional right at his day in court. Justice Black asked: "Could a state
statute of limitations like this one declare that anyone under indictment
who flees the State has thereby waived his right to counsel or his right
to be tried by an unbiased judge ?,,48 Unquestionably, we would all re-
spond negatively. The great danger lies in the affirmative answer of this
next question posed by Justice Black: "If Poret can be denied this
constitutional right, why not others ?'49 Involved here are not only the
rights of the fugitive from justice, but also those of all men accused of
crime. The court should not seek to punish a defendant who is guilty of
having fled either before or after trial by denying him a hearing on a
constitutional question.50 It is submitted that the minority opinion in
the Poret case is the preferable view.
GERALD CORBETT PARKER.
"Compton v. State, 74 Okla. Cr. Rep. 48, 122 P. 2d 819 (1942) ; McAllister
v. State, 30 Ala. App. 366, 6 So. 2d 32 (1942).
" People v. Martin, 380 Ill. 328, 44 N. E. 2d 49 (1942). This decision may be
explained by the fact that the defendant was highly nervous and that the prose-
cutrix was only six years of age.
"' Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 103 (1955) ; cf. It re Murchison, 349 U. S.
133 (1955).
"Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 103 (1955).
t0 Id. at 103: "Poret could have been charged with a federal crime under 62
STAT. 755, 18 U. S. C. § 1073, 18 U. S. C. A. § 1073, for fleeing from one State
to another to avoid prosecution. But he could not have been convicted until after
adequate notice and a fair trial on an indictment returned by a fair grand jury
selected without regard to race or color."
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Military Service-Judicial Review of Draft Classification
A Pennsylvania Quaker named Palmer was a member of a religious
study group in California when he became subject to the Selective Serv-
ice Act of 1948.1 He wrote his California local board that his religious
opposition to war was so total that he could not with conscience submit
himself to military jurisdiction-not even to the extent of registering
with the civilian selective service authorities.2  Nothing happened.
Upon returning to Pennsylvania in 1950, Palmer wrote the California
board of his change of address; he also wrote his local board in Pennsyl-
vania of his presence there, stating his views on refusal to register.
3
Shortly afterward, the Pennsylvania local board wrote Palmer to come
to discuss the matter. He replied that he was aware of a regulation
permitting him to be registered on the basis of information gained from
an interview, without his signing the registration form ;4 therefore he
declined to be interviewed. As a result, Palmer was convicted of the
crime of refusal to register, and served a year and a day in federal prison.
Under a regulation making prison wardens draft registrars of inmates
never previously registered, Palmer was registered against his will the
day he left prison and the form was forwarded to his Pennsyliania
board.6 The board sent Palmer in December, 1951, the standard classi-
162 STAT. 604 (1948) (later amended by 65 STAT. 75 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App.
§§ 451-73 (1952), as amended, 50 U S. C. A. ApP. §§ 454, 454a, 454c-54e, 456, 459,
467 (Supp. August 1955)). The 1951 amendment changed the name of the act
to Universal Military Training and Service Act.
' The Society of Friends has made the following statements as a result of
official meetings: "We believe that every young man who, under a sense of religious
compulsion, feels that he must refuse to comply with the Draft Law, at any point,
should follow the supreme authority of his inner guide." Also: ". . . Friends are
urged ...to support Young Friends and others who express their opposition to
conscription either by non-registration, or by registration as conscientious ob-
jectors . . . . Nevertheless, we hold in respect and sympathetic understanding
all those men who in good conscience choose to enter the armed forces." United
States v. Palmer, 122 F. Supp. 938, 941, n. 7 (E. D. Pa. 1954). Cf. Gara v.
United States, 178 F. 2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), affd by an equally divided court
340 U. S. 857, rehearing denied 340 U. S. 893 (1950) (defendant was convicted of
knowingly counseling and aiding and abetting another to refuse or evade registra-
tion).
' Palmer wrote that he was "a Quaker and a Christian pacifist." "[I] feel that
I should inform you of my presence in the area of your jurisdiction, in case any
inquiries should be made on my case, or any action is desired to be taken against
me." United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893, 903 (3d Cir. 1955) (appendix to
opinions).
'32 C. F. R. § 1613.13 (c) (1954).
32 C. F. R. §§ 1611.6, 1613A1 (a) (1954).
32 C. F. R. § 1613.41 (d) (1954). In the light of § 1642.31, however, it would
seem §§ 1611.6 and 1613.41 were primarily intended to apply to those who were in
prison when they first became subject to registration. Section 1642.31 provides for
more than mere registration; it requires also the filling out of all forms (including
the special one for conscientious objectors) and permits a physical examination
to be given. This is to be done when the prisoner is first taken into custody. If
a man will not sign the forms, the warden may sign for him. Had this procedure
been followed, Palmer might have been spared later grief. But see § 1642.3 (com-
pliance with any or all the procedures of Part 1642 not a condition procedent to
prosecution).
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fication questionnaire,7 which was forwarded from his home address to
him in Oberlin, Ohio, where he was a student in the Graduate School
of Theology of Oberlin College. The next day after receiving the
questionnaire, Palmer returned it unexecuted but with an accompanying
letter informing the board of his student status. He said in the letter
that his refusal to execute the questionnaire was but a continuation of
his prior refusal to register;8 that he was sorry to hamper the board
members in doing what they conceived to be their duty.0 Since one of
the items on the questionnaire concerned religious beliefs, he also en-
closed a lengthy "court statement" that he had made during his trial
for refusal to register concerning the exact nature of his religious be-
liefs. Two days after Palmer mailed this letter, the Dean of the Grad-
uate School of Theology at Oberlin wrote the local board to clarify
Palmer's selective service status.'0 The Dean said that Palmer was a
first year student who had entered the school on a competitive scholar-
ship, and that he was taking a full time regular course."t
In January, 1952, the board ordered Palmer to report on February
15 for a pre-induction physical examination. On February 12, however,
the board on its own motion sent him the special classification form for
conscientious objectors. 12 Yet on February 14, without waiting for the
return of the new form or to see if he would report for the physical
examination, the board classified Palmer I-A.13 He did not, of course,
report for the examination; instead, that day he mailed to the board
his conscientious objector questionnaire unexecuted but with another
accompanying letter. The letter answered substantially every item of
SSS Form No. 100. See 32 C. F. R. § 1621.9 (1954).8 United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893, 895, 897 (3d Cir. 1955) (both ma-
jority and dissent agreed that failure to register and failure to report for in-
duction were separate crimes).
'Id. at 904 (appendix to opinions) : "Please understand that this was not, andis not, intended personally, that I sympathize with your desire to follow the regula-
tions which you are set up to enforce. I do not intend by my actions any criticism
whatever of you in your position."
032 C. F. R. § 1621.12 (b) (1954) : "Any person other than the registrant may
request the deferment of a registrant by filing such request in writing with the
local board together with any information in support of his request... " This sec-
tion is probably not applicable, however, because the Dean did not label his letter
as a request. But cf. United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearing dcnied 216
F. 2d 681 (2d Cir. 1954) (board should have known from context of letter that
"appeal" meant request that classification be re-opened rather than an actual
appeal).
1162 STAT. 611 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (g) (1952), grants
-full time students in recognized theological schools a full exemption from training
and service.1 2 SSS Form No. 150. See 32 C. F. R. § 1621.11 (1954).
' 32 C. F. R. § 1622.1 (c) (1954) : ". . . registrant will be considered as
available for military service until his eligibility for deferment or exemption from
military service is clearly established . . . " Section 1623.1 (b) : ". . . and in the
absence of any other information, when the registrant has failed to furnish such
information within the time prescribed, [board has the power] to classify the
registrant as available for military service."
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information required on the official form,1 4 referring to the "court state-
ment" previously submitted as containing the necessary detailed state-
ment of his religious concepts.15
In April he was again ordered to report for a physical examination;-
the order was ignored. In May he was ordered to report for in-
duction into the armed services; Palmer failed to report. Except
for copies of the board's letters and orders to Palmer and correspond-
ence between the board and the Department of Justice concerning
Palmer's prior criminal status, the above mentioned letters and the
registration form completed by the prison warden 16 comprised the only
information in his selective service file.17
The Department of Justice indicted Palmer for refusal to submit to
induction'8 in compliance with the May order. The district court con-
victed; on appeal, the court of appeals sitting en banc affirmed' 9 the
conviction in a four-to-three decision.20 The United States Supreme
Court denied Palmer's petition for a writ of certiorari.21
Before discussing the reasoning of the opinions in this case, it is
helpful to investigate some of the legal background having a bearing
on the decisions reached. World War I draft cases established that no
one has any constitutional right to exemption from the draft.22 Ex-
emptions, whether for public officials, factory workers, ministers of re-
ligion, or conscientious objectors, are purely a matter of legislative
grace. As a practical matter, exemptions have always been granted
certain classes; nevertheless Congress may exempt or refuse to exempt
1 United States v. Palmer, 122 F. Supp. 938, 939 (E. D. Pa. 1954).
1 See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 378 (1955).
1" See 32 C. F. R. § 1613.41 (b) (1954): ". . . warden . . . shall be careful
not to indicate that the immate was registered in an institution or by an official
thereof. .. ."
17 32 C. F. R. § 1623.1 (b) (1954) : "The registrant's classification shall be
determined solely on the basis of the official forms of the Selective Service System
and such other written information as may be contained in his file; . . .oral in-
formation shall not be considered unless it is summarized in writing and the sum-
mary placed in the registrant's file... .
1862 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1952).
" United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893 (3d Cir. 1955), affirming 122 F. Supp.
938 (E. D. Pa. 1954).
0The majority opinion was written by Goodrich, Circuit Judge, iii which con-
curred Biggs, Chief Judge, and Kalodner and Staley, Circuit Judges. The dis-
senting opinion was written by Maris, Circuit Judge, in which concurred Mc-
Laughlin and Hastie, Circuit Judges.
'1 Palmer v. United States, 350 U. S. 873 (1955).
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918). No cases testing the
constitutionality of conscription reached the U. S. Supreme Court during the Civil
War. Lincoln, speaking of the express constitutional power to raise and support
armies, said this: "The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is
not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose
the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies
given to Congress by the Constitution without an if." George v. United States,
196 F. 2d 445, 455, n. 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 344 U. S. 843 (1952).
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whomever it chooses.23 Congress sold exemptions for three hundred dol-
lars during the Civil War.24 As early as colonial times legislatures have
exempted conscientious objectors from service in the militia.2 i Yet Con-
gress later could validly require civilian or non-combatant military serv-
ice from the conscientious objector rather than grant a complete ex-
emption. 26
Congress may also forclose judicial review of any draft classifica-
tion.2 The current Universal Military Training and Service Act, like
the acts of 1917 and 1940, makes classification by the local board
"final," subject to appeal within the selective service system; and where
there is an appeal, the classification resulting from this is "final" too.28
The object of Congress in providing for this administrative finality is to
prevent any court action from impeding swift and steady conscription
during wartime or any time of emergency." This object is legitimate
under the war powers of the Constitution of the United States; with
the power existing, it may be exercised in peacetime in contemplation of
any future emergency 30
Nevertheless, the federal courts have not completely given up their
power to aid draft registrants deprived of substantial due process by the
selective service authorities. The Selective Draft Act of 191731 was con-
strued to allow federal courts to review by writ of habeas corpus the
draft status of those who claimed that they had been illegally drafted.
The theory used was analogous to that employed by the courts in grant-
ing habeas corpus writs to aliens under deportation orders and to mili-
tary prisoners whose court martial had lacked jurisdiction.82 Under
the 1917 Act the registrant became subject to military law immediately
upon receiving his notice to report; failure to report was the offense of
23 United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423, 429-30 (E. D. Mich. 1917) (exemption
of certain classes from military service does not make conscription laws invalid
as class legislation).
2 Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition it the United
States, 20 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 409, 418 (1952).
2 Russell, supra note 24, at 412-14. The conscientious objector, however,
often had to provide a substitute or pay a commutation fee.
" The 1863-64 Act provided for either noncombatant service or payment of
the commutation fee; the 1917 Act provided for noncombatant service; the 1940
Act provided for either noncombatant service or civilian work of national im-
portance; the 1948 Act (during peacetime) granted complete exemption, but the
1951 amendment substantially restored the provisions of the 1940 Act. Russell,
supra note 24, at 418-28.
2 Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
2862 STAT. 620 (1948), as amended 50 U. S. C. APP. § 460 (b) (3) (1952).
.' Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944).
20United States v. Henderson, 180 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 339
U. S. 963, rehearing denied 340 U. S. 846 (1950).2140 STAT. 76 (1917).
22 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955) ; cf. Shaugh-
nessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 (1955) ; Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Ac-
tion, 15 F. R. D. 411, 433-39 (1954).
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desertion, to be tried before a military court.8 3 Although the temper
of the times had infected even the judiciary to the extent that it was
generally futile to ask for a writ of habeas corpus, the registrant was
able to do so immediately upon being subjected to military jurisdiction
by receipt of the notice to report.3 4
The Selective Service and Training Act of 194035 changed procedure,
however. Military jurisdiction did not attach until the actual induc-
tion.36 Failure to report for or submit to induction was made a felony
to be tried in the federal courts. The first cases, though, tended to apply
the World War I precedents; it was generally held no defense to this
newly created crime that the classification and resulting induction order
may have been issued contrary to the regulations.37  Congress had said
the classification by the selective service authorities was final, and the
courts interpreted this to mean that the registrant must first be inducted
and then ask for a writ of habeas corpus before any sort of judicial re-
view was possible.38
The United States Supreme Court did not treat the issue of in-
validity of classification and the resultant induction order raised as a
defense in the criminal trial until 1944 in Falbo v. United States.3 9
Falbo contended that as a Jehovah's Witness he was a minister; he dis-
puted his classification as a conscientious objector, and refused to report
to the civilian public service camp to do work of national importance. At
the time Falbo was ordered to report, he might have been rejected either
at a military induction center or at a work camp as the result of his
physical examination; the order to report was not the last possible step
in the draft process. Stress was laid upon the "connected series of
steps"'40 contemplated by the statute which was not to be broken by any
'" Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918). The 1917 Act said those
lawfully classified became subject to military jurisdiction upon receipt of the draft
notice. The court did not investigate the merits of the classification; the only
question was whether the military had gained jurisdiction through lawful classi-
fication procedure on the part of the draft authorities.
" See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 546 (1944); United States ex rel.
Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704 (2d Cir. 1923) (notice language in the latter case
at page 710 as to "waiver" resulting from failure to claim exemption).
"54 S'AT. 885 (1940).
"Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 (1944).
'7 See Ex parte Catanzaro, 138 F. 2d 100 (3d Cir. 1943) cert. denied 321 U. S.
793 (1944).
"See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 (1944) (registrant at induction center
refused to take oath; oath was read to him; held, the military did not acquire
jurisdiction). But see Russell, supra note 24, at 424, n. 65, saying regulations
were changed shortly after this case to circumvent that result. Quaere whether
voluntary submission to induction would be a waiver of the right to challenge the
validity of the draft classification; cf. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338
(1946) (involved reporting to civilian camp rather than military center and
the Government claimed waiver).
"320 U. S. 549 (1944).
"Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 553 (1944).
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"litigious interruption" ;41 there was to be no "judicial intervention
before final acceptance" 42 of the registrant. The Court said that even
if the defense of invalidity were admissible, Falbo's refusal to obey had
been premature and was a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The case did not specify how far the registrant would have to go to
exhaust his remedies. However, this case was universally interpreted
by the lower federal courts as holding that the registrant would have to
go at least as far as submitting to induction and that the only possible
judicial review of a draft classification could be by writ of habeas corpus
after induction.43
Then in 1946, the war being over, Estep v. United States4 4 an-
nounced a doctrine permitting review of the draft classification upon the
felony trial. Mentioning that the defendants had pursued their admin-
istrative remedies to the point of going to the induction center (but
refusing to be sworn in), the Court held that it was proper to consider
whether the local board had had jurisdiction in the premises. 45 Saying
that the writ of habeas corpus would be available to the defendant in
jail after conviction because of the invalidity of all subsequent proceed-
ings stemming from an invalid classification, the majority thought it
would be foolish to put a man in jail one day only to have to let him
out the next.46  The test announced was this: "The question of juris-
diction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for
the classification which it gave the registrant."'47
Subsequent cases have refined the rule permitting this limited judicial
review. When the regulations were changed to provide for pre-induction
physical examinations, the Court found it was no longer necessary to
report to the induction center to exhaust administrative remedies. 48
" Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 554 (1944).
"Id. at 554.
"United States v. Flakowicz, 146 F. 2d 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 325
U. S. 851 (1945) ; Rinko v. United States, 147 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 325
U. S. 851, rehearing denied 325 U. S. 894 (1945) ; cf. Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S.
174 (1947) ; Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946).
"327 U. S. 114 (1946).
"The Court said that Falbo v. United States, supra note 39, had been
construed to mean more than it had actually held.
"'But see Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947) (defendants who had exhausted
their administrative remedies and were convicted under the "erroneous" view of
Falbo v. United States, supra note 39, yet were denied habeas corpus because
they had not appealed--despite the fact that an appeal seemed absolutely futile atthe time).hEstep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122-23 (1946). This "basis in fact"
test of jurisdiction seems broader than that applied in some of the wartime habeas
corpus cases, which did not review facts but merely looked to see if procedural op-
portunity to a hearing had been afforded the registrant. Moreover the registrant
carries a greater burden of proof in the habeas corpus proceedings; since Estep v.
United States, supra, the remedy has been little used. See Tietz, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. CALWF. L. REV. 123, 134 (1955).
" Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946).
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The Court soon held that whether or not the local board had any "basis
in fact" for making the classification was a matter of law for the judge,
rather than a jury, to determine.49  In reviewing the classification, the
court may not review additional evidence not considered by the local
board and made part of the registrant's file.50 But where all the evidence
in the file supports the registrant's claim, the board may not deny the
classification "solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation" ;51 the
board must have affirmative evidence in the file showing why it dis-
believes the claim.52  The more recent cases have stressed procedural
due process, requiring local boards and appeal boards to give the regis-
trant notice of any adverse information so that he may rebut it.53 Where
a local board failed to notify the registrant that it had declined to re-open
his classification as requested and kept him in the same category, it was
held that this deprived him of procedural rights.54  And the "basis in
fact" test has been broadened to the extent that convictions have been
reversed where, even though the board may have had some factual basis
40 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947). But even where the court finds
some basis in fact for the classification, the jury may determine whether the board
had acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Imboden v. United States, 194 F. 2d 508
(6th Cir.), cert. denied 343 U. S. 957 (1952).
0 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947).
1 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389, 397 (1953).
"2 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389 (1953). The board here was
determining the "objective fact" whether or not the registrant was a regular or
duly ordained minister. Conscientious objection, however, is a matter of personal
belief and the board's decision necessarily rests in part upon the appearance and
conduct of the registrant and the credibility of his claim-whether contradicted or
not. Because of this personal element, the appeal procedure for a conscientious
objector is different from that for all others, with an F. B. I. report being a
standard feature. The courts, though, seem to require the affirmative evidence in
conscientous objector cases as well as any others, perhaps mainly so that the
courts will have a written record to review. Weaver v. United States, 210
F. 2d 815 (8th Cir. 1954). But see Campbell v. United States, 221 F. 2d 454
(4th Cir. 1955) (relying in part on United States v. Simmons, 213 F. 2d 901 (7th
Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds 348 U. S. 397 (1955)). It has been suggested
the board might satisfy the affirmative evidence requirement merely by indicating
in the file its unfavorable reaction to the registrant's behavior or demeanor or to
certain inconsistencies of the evidence supporting his claim. Witmer v. United
States, 348 U. S. 375, 382 (1955); United States v. Hagaman, 213 F. 2d 86,
89 (3d Cir. 1954).
0" Gonzales v. United States, 348 U. S. 407 (1955) ; Simmons v. United States,
348 U. S. 397 (1955) ; United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 1 (1953) (registrant
had no right to see the adverse information contained in confidential F. B. I. re-
ports, but that he did have the right to a "fair r~sum"). Problems have arisen
as to whether the r~sum6 given was a fair one; thus one court ordered the report
into evidence (ith names deleted) for the purpose of comparison. United States
v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S. D. N. Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds su nor
United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearing denied 216 F. 2d 681 (2d Cir.
1954).
" United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearinq dentied 216 F. 2d 681(2d Cir. 1954) (there was strong basis in fact for disbelieving the claim, but the
procedural error was held to warrant acquittal). But cf. Campbell v. United
States, 221 F. 2d 454, 458 (4th Cir. 1955) (held board was justified in refusing
to re-open classification under parallel regulation).
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for denying the claim, it appeared the selective service authorities acted
upon mistaken assumptions of law.55
It would seem clear that the courts have greatly relaxed much of
the former strictness shown in reviewing draft classifications."0 Never-
theless there are still only two ways in which the registrant may obtain
this judicial review: (1) submit to induction and apply for a writ of
habeas corpus; (2) refuse to submit and raise the defense of invalid
classification in the felony trial.In the principal case of United States v. PalIner 7 the four-to-three
split of opinion emphasizes the growing inclination of the courts to
broaden the scope of their review. The dissenting opinion could cite no
holdings really in point, but relied upon tendencies found in series of
cases or upon analogous decisionsY8 The majority did cite a case which
had bare facts more or less similar to those here, but there was at least
a vast psychological difference between the two cases.5 9
The majority thought that it seemed somewhat strange to talk of
exhausting administrative remedies since Palmer had not availed him-
self of any at all, and expressly affirmed the conviction upon policy
grounds reminiscent of the Falbo decision. (The district court had held
the exhaustion of remedies the controlling factor.) Whether the local
board's classification was arbitrary or illegal was an issue not reached
under this disposition. Instead, the majority spoke of the vital im-
portance of a procedure for the efficient and orderly conscription of
millions of men, and that no one man may set himself above the neces-
sary and reasonable procedures of the selective service system.60
"Annett v. United States, 205 F. 2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953); cf. Sicurella v.
United States, 348 U. S. 385 (1955) (selective service authorities thought as a
matter of law a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses could not be a conscientious
objector because of their belief in self defense and "theocratic wars"; held: Con-
gress had meant present day wars fought with real bullets).
" Shipley, Conscientious Objection: A Problem of Proof, 25 OKLA. B. A. J.
1596 (1954).
"223 F. 2d 893 (3d Cir. 1955), afflrming 122 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa. 1954),
cert. denied 350 U. S. 873 (1955).
"See Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E. D. Pa. 1952) (registrant was
permitted judicial review by writ of habeas corpus although under no restraint;
"constructive custody" theory applied).
" Doty v. United States, 218 F. 2d 93 (8th Cir. 1955). Doty and his three
brothers were convicted of refusal to register; out of prison on parole, the Doty
brothers ignored the correspondence from the local board. Doty wrote the board
only once, saying they were "not subject to whims of the local board" since they
were on parole. Doty's form filled out by the warden gave his occupation as
"rail"--meaning locomotive fireman. Shortly before Doty reached his 26th birth-
day, the board deferred him as a "locomotive engineer." The granting of this
temporary deferment rendered Doty subject to the draft for nine more years,
until the age of 35. Doty claimed the board was "acting out of pique." The
board then classified Doty and his brothers all I-A and ordered them to submit
to induction. In affirming the conviction, the court mentioned, among other things,
that the Doty brothers had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
" "There were on June 30, 1954, about fifteen and a half million young men
registered . . . [with] boards . . . composed of citizens only some of whom are
(Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The dissenting judges thought the affirming of the conviction exalted
form above substance, pointing out that Palmer did in fact supply the
board with enough information to have received one of several classi-
fications lower than I-A.6" Since he was a ministerial student, he would
have been properly placed in Class IV-D (complete exemption)62 or
Class I-S (student deferment until end of academic year).O Since he
had served more than a year in prison, the board could, in its discretion,
have placed him in Class IV-F (complete deferment; physically, men-
tally, or morally unfit) .64 Since he was a complete conscientious ob-
jector, he could have been placed in Class I-0 (available for civilian
work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety or in-
terest) 65 or, failing that, Class I-A-O (induction into the military service
as a noncombatant)."
The dissenting opinion indicated that the classification by the local
board was positively illegal, since the regulations required the board in
classifying to "receive and consider" 67 all pertinent information sub-
mitted-both that on the official forms and "other written information"re6
in the file. The dissent thought that the exclusion of remedies doctrine
lawyers and all of whom serve without pay.. .. It... demands a high degree
of co-operation from everyone involved .... No man has a constitutional right
to be free from a call to military service .... However, a sympathetic Congress,
desirous to afford a maximum of freedom of conscience, has provided for [ex-
emptions and deferments]. It has also provided for a rather elaborate machinery
for appeal .... If rules must be laid down for the handling of court business,
as they are, and the proceedings of administrative bodies, as they are, there is
even greater reason for the establishment of orderly procedure with nearly four
thousand volunteer boards handling the cases of more than fifteen million young
men .... It would only be a step further for this or some other young man to
say that he is so much against war that he will not pay taxes to a government
which spends the majority of its income to maintain a military establishment. It
is only one step further ... to say ... that he feels no moral obligation to obey
anything [the government] says.. . . In other words, he wants this department
of the government run his way. . . . We do not say for a moment that this
defendant is like the rat-like characters who so often come into criminal courts.
He may be the prophet of a new day or he may be more dangerous than some
of the rat-like characters because his type of refusal to co-operate, if sufficiently
widespread, would make organized society impossible." United States v. Palmer,
223 F. 2d 893, 895-97 (3d Cir. 1955) ; cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the University
of Cal., 293 U. S. 245, 265-68 (1934) (concurring opinion of Cardozo, J.).
" A person with grounds for more than one classification is to be placed in the
lowest one. 32 C. F. R. § 1623.2 (1954).
G 32 C. F. R. § 1622.43 (a) (3) (1954).
oB 32 C. F. R. § 1622.15 (b) (1954). Palmer was ordered to report May 20,
1952; this was shortly before the end of his academic year.
, 32 C. F. R. § 1622.44 (c) (1954). But it would be strange to say that one
of Palmer's moral fibre is morally unfit because of the prison sentence.
32 C. F. R. § 1622.14 (1954).
-0 32 C. F. R. § 1622.11 (1954). But it is hardly likely that Palmer would
have submitted to noncombatant service-or even civilian service under the aegis
of the selective service.
'32 C. F. R. § 1622.1 (c) (1954).
as 32 C. F. R. § 1623.1 (b) (1954). But see § 1621.12 (a) (anyone asking for
a deferment must present written information to be "included in or attached to"
the official form).
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should be relaxed in hardship cases, but did not really apply here. In
support of this thesis, it pointed out-that in the Falbo case the language
as to the exhaustion doctrine had been applied to the situation where
further possible remedies were open to the registrant at the time the
order had been disobeyed. 69 Yet by the time Palmer refused to obey
the order the classification had become final and unappealable within
the selective service system, thereby making Palmer's case ripe for
judicial review.70
Both the majority and dissent in the principal case are persuasive. 71
They illuminate problems of construing the Universial Military Train-
ing and Service Act72 that will continue to perplex the courts. Congress
adopted the basic act in 1948 during peacetime, retaining substantially
the same language as that in the 1940 Act as to the finality of classifica-
tion by the draft authorities. The legislative history shows this was
expressly done so that the Falbo and Estep doctrines of limited court
review would continue to apply.73
The 1951 amendments, enacted during the Korean War, changed the
name of the act from "selective" to "universal"; also, conscientious ob-
jectors were deprived of the complete exemption granted in 1948 and
the "work or fight" provision was restored. 4 On the basis of legislative
intent it might seem that Congress meant for courts to interfere only to
a very limited extent with the selective service machinery-machinery
to be kept in readiness for high speed functioning without any clogs or
obstructions. Although the 1951 amendments did not change the
language relating to administrative finality, at that time Falbo and Estep
were still substantially unmodified." It was only later that the crop of
Korean War cases began reaching the appellate level with the result that
inroads were made upon the original strict doctrine.76
Viewed as a matter of policy, apart from any assumed Congressional
" But the language used by the Court there and in succeeding decisions was
broad enough (and often harsh enough) to include a case of this type.7o 32 C. F. R. § 1641.2 (b) (1954) (waiver of rights not exercised). The
limited right of appeal for special reasons after the expiration of the time limit
exists only until the order to report for induction is mailed. 32 C. F. R. § 1626.2(d) (1954). The same is true of the right to request that the classification be
re-opened. 32 C. F. R § 1625.2 (Supp. 1955).
' It should be repeated that the majority opinion did not affirm on the technical
basis of the exhaustion of remedies rule but rather for pure policy reasons. The
dissent, on the other hand, used "legal" reasoning in determining that Palmer
should not have been convicted.
7'62 STAT. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 451-73 (1952), as
amended, 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 454, 454a, 454c-54e, 456, 459, 467 (Supp. August
1955).
S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2008 (1948).
7'65 STAT. 86 (1951), 50 U. S. C. Ap. § 456 (j) (1952).
SE.g., Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389 (1953) (note date; settled
that boards must "build" a record for review).
"For example, the principal case was no finally decided until 1955, although
Palmer's refusal to report was in May, 1952.
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intent,77 there would seem to be some need for court review on an ex-
panded basis. Court opinions are carefully read in the Department of
Justice, which plays a major part in the draft process. 78 This unques-
tionably has had the effect of reducing arbitrary decisions and potential
administrative tyranny.7 9 Even under emergency conditions the con-
cept of certain minimum standards of due process and fair dealing, for
the nonconformist as well as the conformist, forms a part of our tradi-
tion of liberty.80
LEWIS POINDEXTER WATTS, JR.
Operation of Pathological and X-Ray Facilities by Charitable
Hospital as Corporate Practice of Medicine
A decision' of national significance was recently handed down by the
district court of Iowa in an action involving the right of 170 hospitals,
which comprise plaintiff-Iowa Hospital Association, to continue to
operate pathology and X-ray laboratories and collect for these services
from patients. 2  The court ruled that the hospitals, in purveying these
services to patients, were illegally engaged in the practice of medicine.
" 62 STAT. 620 (1948), as amended 50 U. S. C. Ap'. § 460 (b) (3) (1952), has
not been changed insofar as it relates to administrative finality; yet Congress has
amended or added several sections to the act, e.g., 1955 Amendments to the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act, Act of June 30, 1955, c. 250, 69 STAT.
223 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U. S. C. App.). Note also 69 STAT.
602 (1955), 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 454 (d) (3), 456 (c) (2), (d) (1)-(2)
(Supp. August 1955).
"8 Shipley, Conscientious Objection--A Legal Right, 13 FED. B. J. 282, 286
(1953) (Mr. Shipley is listed as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of
the United States).
" Cf. United States v. Hagaman, 312 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1954): "[I]n re-
cent months Courts of Appeals have had to consider a whole series of rather
similar cases where unexplained orders of the national board changing the classi-
fication of Jehovah's Witnesses from 1-0 to 1-A make sense only if they repre-
ent a consistent administrative application of this understandable, if mistaken,
legal theory [that Jehovah's Witnesses are as a matter of law not conscientious
objectors because of their belief in 'theocratic war']." See note 55 supra.
Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. CALIF. L. REy.
123, 135-36 & nn. 38-39 (1955), tells of the use of suspended sentences to prevent
injustice. The District Court suspended Palmer's sentence rather than send him
to prison a second time. Tietz mentions that one Jehovah's Witness has been
prosecuted four times.
so See Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 555-61 (1944) (dissenting opinion
of Murphy, J.).
Iowa Hospital Association, et al., v. Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners;
et. al, Iowa State Medical Society, Intervenor, an unreported decision of the
District Court, Ninth Judicial District of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, No. 63095,
Equity, decided 28 Nov., 1955.
2 Plaintiffs, because of a ruling of the Attorney General of Iowa dated 19
February, 1954, to the effect that operation by hospitals of laboratory and X-ray
facilities, with billing of the patients by the hospitals, violated the Iowa Medical
Practice Acts (Iowa Code, ch. 147), sought a declaratory judgment. In addition
to the defendant and intervenor, the suit was defended by the Attorney General
of Iowa.
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The court found as a fact that the arrangements employed in operating
these laboratory and X-ray services have been almost universally adopted
by hospitals throughout the United States.m 3
The facts giving rise to the controversy may be summarized as fol-
lows: 4 In all plaintiff-hospitals, operated as non-profit corporations,
pathology laboratory procedures of a routine nature are undertaken by
lay technicians employed by the hospitals. This work is done only at
the request of the attending physician, to whom the technician reports
his findings. In 127 of the 170 hospitals there is no full-or-part-time
pathologist, but the routine laboratory work is done under the super-
vision of a physician, and those laboratory procedures requiring more
highly skilled determinations are accomplished on a mail or delivery
basis by a pathologist in a nearby city. The hospital collects the charges
from the patient for these services, including those of the pathologist,
and compensates the pathologist on a per case or per examination basis.
In those hospitals having a full-or-part-time pathologist, the billing
arrangement is the same, the only difference being that the laboratory
is under the supervision of the pathologist, and he is compensated on a
salary or percentage of laboratory income basis, the latter being more
common. The plaintiffs, in supplying X-ray services, employ X-ray
technicians and all have either a full-or-part-time radiologist, with a
system of billing of patients and compensation of radiologists substanti-
ally like the arrangements with the pathologists.
It was agreed that there had been no actual interference by the hos-
pital trustees or administrators with the professional services of the
pathologists and radiologists and that the dispute did not involve the
quality of laboratory and X-ray services.0
Upon these facts, the court concluded that: (1) the work done by
the pathologists, radiologists, and the technicians working in the path-
ology and X-ray laboratories (italics supplied) constitutes the practice
of medicine; (2) under Iowa law the privilege of practicing medicine
At the conclusion of the trial, the house of delegates of the American Medical
Association approved a resolution congratulating the physicians who had labored to
bring about the initial phase of what they described as a decision which will
have a far reaching effect upon the practice of medicine throughout the nation.
Vol. 86, The Modem Hospital, 49, January 1956.
* From the statement of facts, opinion of the court.
Procedures undertaken are in seven categories, to wit: 1) bacteriology, 2)
blood bank and serology, 3) biochemistry, 4) hematology, 5) urinalysis, 6) special
tests, and 7) pathologic anatomy, although in many hospitals facilities are available
for only a portion of these. The work in the first six categories is considered of
a routine nature, and comprises about 90-95% of all laboratory work.
' Indeed all defendant's testified that they were well satisfied with their relation-
ships with the hospitals, and that their concern was only with the system of billing.
Conclude Hearings in Iowa, Vol. 86, The Modern Hospital, Dec. 1955.
The court remarked that, under all arrangements, the doctor and the hospital
do very well financially.
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is a personal one requiring qualifications which cannot be met by a
corporation; and (3) plaintiff-hospitals are not excluded from the pro-
visions of the Iowa Practice Acts because they are non-profit corpora-
tions, or because of long standing custom, or public policy, and therefore
have been engaged in the unauthorized, unlicensed and illegal practice
of medicine.
The case has been appealed by the plaintiff-Iowa Hospital Associa-
tion.7 Because of the possible far reaching effects of the decision, it may
be worthwhile to examine the court's reasoning and authorities to de-
termine the probable outcome on appeal.
(1) In support of its finding that the work done by the pathologist
and radiologist constitutes the practice of medicine, the court cited the
cases of State v. Hughey8 and State v. HowardO for the proposition that
one who diagnoses is engaged in the practice of medicine. The court
also cited with approval the case of Granger v. Adson,'0 in which a lay-
man was conducting a health audit. For a fee of $10 a year, plaintiff
contracted to furnish four urinalyses and a blood pressure test to his
subscribers. It appeared that a Dr. Graves, a pathologist, had been
hired by plaintiff to perform these tests. After holding that the path-
ologist was engaged in practicing medicine, the Minnesota court said:"
"If Dr. Graves was practicing medicine in what he did and in de-
termining for the plaintiff whether the condition of the urine was normal
or abnormal, then, in our opinion, the plaintiff was practicing medicine
when he passed on to his subscribers the result of the analysis...."
In finding that the work done by the hospital technicians constitutes
the practice of medicine, 12 the court relied upon a broad interpretation
of the Iowa Medical Practice Act,'3 and reasoned that from the work
" At a general assembly meeting of the Iowa Hospital Association the vote was
unanimous to appeal the ruling. A. A. Herrick and Herschel G. Langdon, at-
torneys for the plaintiff, estimated the appeal would take one year. Vol. 86, The
Modern Hospital, 51, Jan. 1956.
0208 Iowa 842, 226 N. W. 371 (1929). This case involved a "magnetic healer"
who laid on hands to cure after purporting to determine the physical ailment.
0 216 Iowa 545, 249 N. W. 391 (1933). In this case defendant was enjoined
from practicing medicine after 21 years practice of naprapathy, a supposed science
by which the defendant purported to diagnose illnesses, previously unknown to
medical science, and then to cure them.10210 Minn. 113, 250 N. W. 722 (1933).
11210 Minn. 113, 115, 250 N. W. 722, 723 (1933).
In Chicago at a special meeting of the American Hospital Association called
to discuss the ruling in the instant case, attorneys for the Association agreed that
the most damaging aspect of the decision, as well as the one most likely to be over-
ruled on appeal, was the ruling that laboratory and X-ray technicians are engaged
in the practice of medicine. The Modern Hospital, note 7, mipra.
", Iowa Code, ch. 148.1, is the relevant portion. Persons engaged it; Practice.
For the purpose of this title, the following classes of persons shall be deemed to
be engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery:
(1) Persons who publicly profess to assume the duties incident to thie practice
of medicine or surgery.
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of these technicians a conclusion would be reached by the pathologist,
radiologist or physician in charge, hence a diagnosis, and that they were
"serving as the hands of the pathologist, radiologist, or physician in
charge."
This holding that hospital laboratory technicians are practicing medi-
cine is not without judicial dissent. In the only decision in whch this
issue has been squarely presented, the question before the New York
court1 4 was whether a test by a laboratory technician for the RH blood
factor of the hospital patient was a medical act or an administrative act
for which the hospital could be held liable. The court held that the
act was, as a matter of law, an administrative act of fact finding which
bore some relation to the field of medicine, but was not a part of it. One
writer 15 has emphatically expressed this view as follows:
"To say that a hospital may not operate an X-ray department or a
clinical laboratory because in so doing it is engaged in the practice
of medicine is, of course, perfectly absurd and unreasonable. It so
happens that in these two fields the technicial procedures em-
ployed are almost entirely the products of learning of the sciences
of physics, chemistry and biology, and this knowledge belongs to
the general field of learning and not to the medical profession
alone. . . . Indeed, this work is commonly performed by lay
technicians and medical training is not necessary ... "
Whether the technicians working in the pathology and X-ray lab-
oratories are engaged in the practice of medicine or not, it is to be
emphasized that the issue of unqualified persons practicing medicine on
the public was not involved, since the defendants did not seek a change
in the manner of doing the work or of the personnel who performed it.
It would seem the only evil which the defendants sought to have cor-
rected was the billing of patients and the setting of fees by the hospitals
instead of by the pathologist and radiologists. 16
(2) and (3) In reaching its decision that by employing these persons
which the court found to be practicing medicine the charitable hospital
corporations were thus engaged in the illegal practice of medicine, the
(2) Persons who prescribe or prescribe and furnish medicine for human ail-
ments or treat the same by surgery.(3) Persons who act as representatives of any person in doing any of the things
mentioned in this section.
11Berg v. New York Society for relief, 136 N. Y. S. 2d, 258 (1954).
" Medical Education and the Public, Earl D. McKinley, M. D., Dean of George
Washington School of Medicine.
" The issue, as seen by Dr. Snoke, president of the American Hospital Associa-
tiofi, and a witness for plaintiff, was tersely expressed: "It involves a handful of
dirty bills. If the pathologist gets them, then he is legitimate. If he draws
a check, tien he is illeitiate. It doesn't make'sense." The Burning Questio it
Iowa, Vol. 81 Hospital Management 58 (Jan. 1956).
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trial court gave a literal construction to the Iowa Practice Act, the rele-
vant portion of which follows :17
"Qualifications: No person shall be licensed to practice a pro-
fession under this until he shall have furnished satisfactory evi-
dence to the department that he has attained the age of 21 years
and is of good moral character. .. ."
The court reasoned that under this act, a corporation, not being a "per-
son," could not qualify, and stated that Iowa is in accord with the
general rule that a corporation cannot practice a profession.1 8  The
court quoted from the case of Dr. Allison, Dentist v. Allison.19
"It (a corporation) can have neither honesty nor conscience, and
its loyalty must, in the very nature 6f its being, be yielded to its
managing officers, its directors, and its stockholders. Its em-
ployees must owe their allegiance to their corporate employer, and
can not give the patient anything better than a divided loyalty."
The court felt that the charitable nature of these plaintiff-hospitals had
no bearing on the application of the practice acts, citing cases in which
collection agencies, organized as non-profit corporations to collect for
non-profit corporations were held to be engaged in the illegal practice
of law.20 The court stated that good motives did not provide an im-
munity from the application of the practice acts, and that the reasons
given in the decisions condemning corporate practice generally are
applicable to non-profit corporations.
This challenge of the right of hospitals to operate laboratory and
X-ray facilities is one of first impression and, in fact, no reported cases
1' Iowa Code, ch. 147.3.
18 The court cited the following authority and cases in support of the general
rule that a corporation cannot practice a profession: 13. Am. Jur. 838; People by
Kerner v. United Medical Services, Inc. 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157, 103 ALR
1229 (1936), (operation of a clinic for profit by a corporation of laymen) ; State v.
Kindly Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W. 332 (1933), (corporation of laymen
operating an optical business for profit and employing optometrist) ; State v. Baker,
212 Iowa 571, 235 N. W. 313 (1931) (lay clinic for cancer cure) ; State v. Bailey
Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931), (corporation of laymen who
operated a dental business for profit by employing licensed dentists) ; People v.
Painless Parker Dentists, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (one of a series of actions
brought against a dentist who changed his named to "Painless" and established
a network of corporations to pratice dentistry).360 Ill. 638, 196 N. E. 799, 800 (1935).
20 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Motorist Association of Illinois
354 I1. 595, 188 N. E. 827 (1933) ; Hospital Credit Exchange v. Shapero, 59
N. Y. S. 2d 812 (1946).
In the latter case, the court stated at page 816, "not so easily is the law cir-
cumvented . . . any organization could thus become a charitable corporation if it
organized under the membership corporation law instead of under the stock ex-
change law, if it undertook tb serve only charitable corporations, and if after
remunerating its staff however handsomely it distributed its so called profits among
its clients." The court quoted this in the principal case.
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have been found where courts have directly prevented "corporate prac-
tice of medicine"21 by a charitable institution. An examination of this
area of the law should be useful in determining the probable result on
appeal. At the outset it should be noted that while numerous state
statutes directly forbid the corporate practice of law,22 express prohibi-
tion of the corporate practice of medicine is rare. Instead, denial is
based, as in the instant case, upon those statutes regulating the licensing
of persons practicing medicine and surgery,23 with which provisions
corporations can not comply.24 While broad expressions abound which
catagorically deny to corporations the right to practice medicine,25 an
observation should be made that these decisions, chiefly involving the
practice of dentistry and optometry, concern corporations operated for
profit, and underlying most all of them, as well as those decisions
cited by the trial court,26 is an unmistakable element of quackery.
While it is clear that by any construction of state practice acts, a
corporation itself could never, be licensed to practice one of the learned
professions, the inference that they automatically forbid any utilization
of the corporate device is not so patent. It has been suggested,2 7 that as
the judiciary has no intrinsic power to regulate the medical profession as
it does the legal profession, since judicial power over the legal profession
rests on the status of the lawyer as an officer of the court,28 the validity
of the viewpoint that the state licensing statutes forbid any corporate
practice of medicine depends upon the soundness of the inference that
they automatically forbid utilization of the corporate device.
By any view, a proper construction and application of these statutes
would seem to require that regard be had for their purpose. Uniformly,
the function of these laws has been said to be the protection of the
2 Exception has been taken to the use of the term "corporate practice of medi-
cine." In 6 LAW AND CONTEmpORARY PROBLEMS 225 (1931), the writer points out
that the phrase conceals faulty analysis. It is pointed out that it is not the act
of the agent which is imputed to the corporate employer, but rather its conse-
quences, so that by a proper application of these principles, if the act of the
agent in furnishing medical services has been within the proper scope of pro-
fessional conduct, there is no liability consequent upon it to be imposed on the
corporation, and hence no occasion for use of the term corporate practice of medi-
cine. It seems a nice distinction.
22 Typical Statutes are: Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 32, 411; Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932) c. 221, 846; N. Y. Penal Law 280.
22 Laws and Board Rulings Regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States (abstract published by American Medical Association, containing in con-
venient form the legislation pertaining to the practice of medicine in every state).
2Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P 2d
992 (1925) ; People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157, (1936).
" See the numerous cases cited in 102 ALR 343 (1936); 103 ALR 1240
(1936) ; 119 ALR 1290 (1936).
2 See footnotes 8, 9, 10, and 18, supra.
2'48 Yale Law Journal 346 at 347 (1938).2
"Ex Parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273 (1882) ; People ex rel. Ill. State Bar
Ass'n v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank, 334 Ill. 462, 474, 176 N. E. 901, 906
(1931). No similar basis has been claimed over the medical profession.
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public from quacks and charlatans, and the preservation of the public
health by exclusion from medical practice of persons with inadequate
ability, morality, and training.29 One writer has suggested 0 that
as the corporation itself would be unable to perform any of the purely
personal functions of practicing medicine, there would seem to be no
valid reason, within the intent of the licensing statutes, to require that
the corporation be licensed so long as all the individuals administering
to the public are licensed. The ultimate issue would then become
whether in each individual case those licensed persons are controlled in
their professional functions by unlicensed persons in such manner as to
nullify the purpose of the licensing statutes. However, as has been
pointed out,3 ' this oversimplication ignores a public policy objection to
corporate practice of medicine which lies within the sphere of individual
motivation. Other of the most common public policy objections to the
corporate practice of medicine have been stated to be impairment of the
intimate doctor-patient relationship and commercialization of the medical
profession.3 2
In any event, it is common knowledge that many forms of corporate
practice of medicine are employed.33 Railroads and large industrial con-
cerns have long employed doctors to administer to their employees.
Hospitals all employ interns and resident physicians on salary; group
health plans have been organized to provide services of physicians to
members in plans analogbus to hospital insurance programs, and more
recently, physicians have themselves incorporated in large clinics to avoid
liabilities for acts of member physicians attendant to partnerships. Al-
though for the most part their legal status has not been determined,
those decisions which have dealt with the matter have by no means been
unanimous in holding the activity illegal.
Without adopting the view that the licensing statutes do not forbid
per se the utilization of the corporate power, it is impossible to recon-
cile the decisions which allow some corporate forms of medical practice
to exist in the face of decisions denying it in others. It is submitted that
underlying the decisions in the better reasoned cases which do not talk
2
1 Laws and Board Rulings Regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States, note 23, supra.30 Op. cit., note 27, supra.
31 Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice
of Medicine, 6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMs, 525 at 527 (1939).
" People v. Pacific Health Corp., 200 Cal. 160, 82 P. 2d 429 (1938) ; People v.
United Medical Service Inc. 362 Ill. 422, 455, 200 N. E. 157, 163 (1936). Plain-
tiffs argued that because of the lack of profit motive of the corporate employer,
and because pathologist and radiologist are doctors's doctors, these public policy
objectives were inapplicable.
11See, generally, 1 Fletcher, Corporations (perm. ed. 1931) 897, Davis, Do
Corporations Practice Medicine? Proceedings 1932, 88, et seq.; 17 N. C. L. REv.
183 (1939) ; 37 Micr. L. REv. 961 (1939).
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in broad terms of "illegal corporate practice of medicine," is the judge's
concept of how the arrangement in controversy actually operates, as
against a background of the purposes of the medical practice acts and
public policy objections to the corporate practice of medicine.
In a California decision 34 a stock corporation operated by laymen
for a profit sold contracts which entitled the holder to medical services
by a designated physician. The court held this to constitute the unlaw-
ful practice of medicine. Emphasis was placed by the court on the
profit motive of the corporation.86  In a District of Columbia case, ° an
opposite result was reached. In that case, a Group Health Association,
a non profit corporation, was organized by federal employees to provide
medical service on a monthly payment basis. The court distinguished
the admittedly illegal practice of medicine by a corporation from merely
furnishing medical services, and found the corporation to be legal.
Since neither of the corporations in the foregoing cases actually
sought to "practice medicine" but rather both were "furnishing medical
services," any distinction which does not take the public policy merits
of the two cases into consideration must be indeed fancifulB7
In United States v. American Medical Association,8" the court ob-
served:
"In all the cases we have examined in which the practice (of medi-
cine by a corporation) has been condemned, the profit object of
the offending corporation has been shown to be its main purpose,
and in no case were the circumstances precisely like those de-
scribed in the indictment, i.e., a non-profit organization conducted
so that the proper doctor-patient relationship is preserved. .. .
While the issue was decided on the pleadings, the court stated that it
considered the corporation, similar to that described in the District of
Columbia case, to be legal.
New York decisions are clearly committed to the proposition that
"'People v. Pacific Health Corp., note 32, supra.
" Ibid., at p. 166, the court stated, "Such activities are not comparable to those
of private corporations operated for profit and, since the principal evils attendant
upon corporate practice of medicine spring from the conflict between the pro-
fessional standards and obligations of the doctors and the profit motive of the
corporation employer, it may well be concluded that the objections of policy do
not apply to non-profit institutions. This view seems implicit in the decisions of
the courts and it has certainly been the assumption of the public authorities,
which have, as far as we are advised, never molested these organizations."
" Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 Fed. Supp. 445 (D. C. D. C. 1938).
17 Ibid., p. 446, clearly enunciates as the basis for its decision,
"The question here is one of statutory construction. It is evident that the
purpose of the statute was to protect the public from quacks, from the ignorant
and incompetent. The actions of the plaintiff in no way tend to commercialize
the practice of medicine."
88110 F. 2d 703, 714 (C. A. D. C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 644, 605 S. Ct.
1096.
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charitable and public institutions in corporate form may practice medi-
cine.30 In the case of Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York,40
the issue was the right of plaintiff-hospital to collect for surgical fees
for an operation performed by a staff surgeon. It was not alleged
that the laboratory and X-ray services provided by the hospital consti-
tuted the practice of medicine, but it was argued that actual surgical
services performed by physicians working for the hospital did constitute
the practice of medicine and was unlawful under the New York Medical
Practice Act. The court stated :41
"It is common knowledge that in addition to maintenance, hos-
pitals provide a multitude of other services such as X-rays, lab-
oratory tests, physical therapy, medicines, the use of their medical
and surgical treatment....
"The general rule that a corporation may not practice medicine
has its exception in charitable hospital corporations which are
organized for the express purpose and are sanctioned by law to
treat the sick and injured ......
Thus it will be observed that the courts have in many instances recog-
nized the social utility of a particular corporate form and found the
general rule inapplicable.
The social utility of operation by hospitals of laboratory and X-ray
services would seem to be well worth consideration. The trial judge
in his decree stated that nothing therein should be construed so as to
deny to the hospitals the right to own these laboratory and X-ray facili-
ties. Since the hospitals, by this decree may own, but not operate these
facilities, they are faced with two alternatives. They may either sell
these facilities outright and contract the work outside, thus losing 24
hour-a-day standby service, or they may lease these facilities to the
pathologists and radiologists. The latter alternative could lead to com-
plications of no small proportions. Some of the possible complications
which have been suggested 42 are:
(1) Many state supreme courts have held that county facilities may not
be leased, and a number of county hospitals are involved in the
action.
(2) The Code of Iowa, 1954, as well as most state laws, exempts from
" Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 242 (1938);
Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. S. 1111 (1937);
People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E.
697 (1908) ; Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Sev. 215, 113 N. Y. S. 772, aff.
198 N. Y. S. 32, 92 N. E. 1107 (1910).
"0 7 N. Y. S. 2d, 242 (1938). The trial court conceded that if the Goldwater
case is the law of Iowa, the plaintiffs must prevail.
,Ibid., p. 246.
"The Burning Question in Iowa, note 16, supra.
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taxation grounds and buildings of charitable hospitals used solely
for their appropriate objects, and not leased or otherwise used with
a view to profit. Thus a lease to a private practitioner, engaged in
practice for a profit, presents the problem of a possible loss of tax
exemption.
(3) Under the Hifi-Burton Act, which provides for federal grant in
aid to hospitals, a hospital must be entirely non-profit to qualify, and
some fear that a lease of facilities to a profit-making group may
make the leasing hospital ineligible.
In view of the long standing and almost universal practice of opera-
tion by hospitals of these facilities, and the tremendous degree of public
interest involved,43 it is to be hoped that whatever the outcome, the de-
cision will be fashioned from the court's consideration of whether the
arrangement in controversy offends either the purposes of the medical
practice acts or is attended by any of the common public policy objec-
tions to the corporate practice of medicine.
It is hoped that the Iowa court will reconsider the broad maxim con-
demring all corporations alike. While it undoubtedly served satis-
factorily in the past when it was invoked against anti-social activities
exclusively, it becomes oppressive when applied to corporations operated
for the public benefit.
JACK T. HAMILTON.
Sales-Breach of Warranty-Allergies
A condition diagnosed as weeping dermatitis appeared on plaintiff's
scalp and neck after she had used defendant's hair rinse.1 She sued for
breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose intended. There was no
evidence of deleterious or poisonous substances in the product. The
evidence introduced was that plaintiff applied the rinse to her hair;
that as a result she contracted dermatitis, and that a friend had a similar
experience with the same rinse. The court refused recovery, indicated
that her injury might have been caused by an allergy, and added: "... in
an action by the buyer of a product against the seller for breach of
warranty to recover damages for injuries resulting from the use of the
product, there is no liability upon the seller, where the buyer was
allergic or unusually susceptible to injury from the product, which fact
was wholly unknown to the seller and peculiar to the buyer."2
' Of especial interest to the public is the effect upon the various Blue Cross
plans of hospital insurance, which now insure and pay for laboratory and X-ray
services furnished by hospitals, since it is a part of the hospital bill. Some fear
this plan may be impaired and disrupted if the charges are made by the doctor.
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N. C. 268, 90 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
'Id. at 269.
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North Carolina has not been wholly consistent in determining
whether there is an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended
in the sale of goods. Earlier cases held that there was no warranty and
applied the rule of caveat emptor,3 but the trend in recent cases has
been toward holding there is such a warranty. In only two cases did
the court indicate there must be reliance on the seller's skill and judg-
ment.4 Other cases do not raise such a condition.5 These latter cases
are inconsistent with the weight of authority in other states in that
the majority of courts recognize an implied warranty if the goods are
sold for a particular purpose, but only if the buyer relies on the seller's
skill and judgment.6 The Uniform Sales Act also provides that if the
article is sold for a particular purpose and the buyer relies on the seller's
skill and judgment, there is an implied warranty of fitness. 7 Often the
particular purpose is commensurate with the general purpose, in which
case the buyer will not be required literally to communicate the par-
ticular purpose to the seller.s .
In the light of the foregoing it is seen that North Carolina is liberal
in extending the implied warranty. Actions against seller for injuries
to the buyer can also be grounded on negligence9 or false representa-
tion.10
The implication of the principal case is that a buyer can never re-
'Dickson v. Jordan, 33 N. C. (11 Ired.) 166, 53 Am. Dec. 403 (1850) ; Wool-
dridge v. Brown, 149 N. C. 299, 62 S. E. 1076 (1908).
' Stokes v. Edwards, 230 N. C. 306, 52 S. E. 2d 797 (1949) ; Poovey v. Inter-
national Sugar Feed No. 2 Co., 191 N. C. 722, 133 S. E. 12 (1926).
See Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 351 (1949) for an excellent discussion of the
development of implied warranties in North Carolina.
046 Am. JuR., Sales §§ 346, 348 (1943) ; 77 C. J. S., Sales §§ 315(b), 325(b)
(1952) ; 1 WILIrSTON, SALES §§ 206, 235 (Rev. ed. 1948).
"UNIFORM SAIS ACr § 15 (1). The Uniform Sales Act, which has been
adopted in 37 States, but not in North Carolina, also includes one unfortunate pro-
vision which has caused buyers and courts much consternation. It provides that
if the article is sold under a "patent or other trade name" there is no implied
warranty. This phrase would deny the warranty even though there was reliance
by the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment. Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 1389,
1393-1395 (1948); UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15 (4). The Uniform Revised Sales
Act has omitted this provision. UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT § 39.
'Clover Cutting Die Co. v. Sam Smith Shoe Corp., 96 N. H. 491, 79 A. 2d 8
(1951); Libke v. Craig, 35 Wash. 2d 870, 216 P. 2d 189 (1950); Vaccarino v.
Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mer-
cantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942).
' Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P. 2d 525 (1951) ; Annot.,
26 A. L. R. 2d 958, 973 (1951); Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
231 N. C. 270, 56 S. E. 2d 689 (1949) ; Dalrymple v. Sinkoe, 230 N. C. 453, 53
S. E. 2d 437 (1949) ; Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N. C. 105, 16
S. E. 2d 680 (1941); Corum v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171
S. E. 78 (1933); Cashwell v. Fayetteville Pepsi Cola Bottling Works, 174 N. C.
324, 93 S. E. 901 (1917).
'0 American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Skinner, 225 N. C. 285, 34 S. E. 2d 190
(1945) ; Hill v. Snider, 217 N. C. 437, 8 S. E. 2d 202 (1940) ; Cleary v. John M.
Mars Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (1940) ; Drake v. Herrman, 261 N. Y.
414, 185 N. E. 685 (1933); Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 134 S. E. 406
(1926); Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E. 252 (1922).
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cover for breach of warranty if the injury results from his own hyper-
sensitive or allergic condition and this condition is unknown to the
seller. The inquiry of this note is whether or not there is or should be
a distinction drawn between common allergies and those that are rare.
Several cases have discussed the ratios of allergic to non-allergic
persons with respect to various products," but none have based their
holdings on the ratio. Those courts denying recovery have simply said
there is no warranty of fitness to allergic persons ;12 and those allowing
recovery have made the seller liable for injuries to the hypersensitive
as well as the normal person.' 3
The rationale for refusing to extend the warranty to idiosyncratic
persons is that a seller is not bound to anticipate injury to the small
group injured. This reasoning would be valid in actions based on
negligence because of the requirement of foreseeability; but warranty,
even though closely allied with tort,14 should not be based on prevision
of harm. Negligence should not be the test in an action for breach of
warranty.
An interesting case arising in Massachusetts, Bianchi v. Denholm
McKay Co.,' 5 held that if the product was known to be injurious to
"some" persons, even though admittedly in a "non-average" class be-
cause of their peculiar sensitivity or allergy, the seller could not be heard
to say the warranty did not extend to them. This class of "non-average"
persons was not designated by numbers or percentage. The Bianchi
case has struck a medium between the two extremes mentioned above
but the liability of the seller is based on scienter in that the seller must
know the product is injurious to a class of persons. There are probably
many substances that will produce adverse reactions in a comparatively
" Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N. J. L. 21, 4 A. 2d 73 (1939) (4 or
5 in 100) ; Hesse v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 149 Atl. 96 (1930) (1 in
1,000,000) ; Antowill v. Friedmann, 197 App. Div. 230. 188 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1921)
(1 in 200, or 300) ; Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N. W. 48
(1913) (1 in 100).
"Longo v. Touraine Stores, Inc., 319 Mass. 727, 66 N. E. 2d 792 (1946);
Stanton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N. E. 2d 801 (1942) ; Zager
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P. 2d 389 (1939); Ross v.
Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A. 2d 650 (1939). Of course
where there is a toxic chemical, or the product is adulterated, the warranty will
extend. Rogiers v. Gilchrist Co., 312 Mass. 544, 45 N. E. 2d 744 (1942) (toxic
chemical); Sapiente v. Waltuch, 127 Conn. 224, 15 A. 2d 417 (1940) (food in-
fested with bugs) ; Pietrus v. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N. W. 2d 799 (1949)(excessive amount of alkali) ; Smith v. Burdine's Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223
(1940) (poison in lipstick).
" Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N. J. L. 475, 52 A. 2d 666 (1947);
Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 46 N. E. 2d 12 (1942) (Here although
there was evidence that contact dermatitis was classified in the "allergy" group
of disturbances, the recovery by the buyer was allowed even though the court did
not refer to any showing that the dye contaned any poisonous substances) ; Zir-
pola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N. J. L. 21, 4 A. 2d 73 (1939).
'1 WI.LIST0 , SALES § 195 (rev. ed. 1948).
1302 Mass. 469, 19 N. E. 2d 697 (1939).
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large class of sensitive persons,16 and yet the seller is likely to have no
knowledge of this and, under the holding of the Bianchi case, will not
be liable. An earlier case in Massachusetts, Flynn v. Bedell,'7 flatly
refused recovery to the plaintiff on the ground that the idiosyncrasy was
"wholly unknown" to the seller. The words in the principal case are
in part identical with those used by the Massachusetts court in the
Flynn case.18 It remains to be seen whether our court will follow the
Bianchi case if a set of facts arises whereby the seller knows the product
will produce inflammation in those with hypersensitive skins. Sometimes
a "spot patch" test can be used to determine one's susceptibility to cer-
tain products, and dealers usually give directions for such a test if there
is a known irritant in the product. 9 For goods taken internally, how-
ever, there can, of course, be no spot test.
The principal case is one of first impression in North Carolina and
the court went along with the majority view in saying breach of war-
ranty does not extend to persons having allergies. The court, citing
Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co °20 said, "It would seem that the
cause of plaintiff's dermatitis remains a matter of doubt and conjec-
ture." 21 The Ross case denied recovery on the ground that by the evi-
dence presented it was conjectural whether the plaintiff had an allergy,
in which case there would be no recovery, or whether the product was
adulterated; and that the court would not deal with conjecture nor
attempt to guess the cause of the injury. The language of the principal
case is that if the buyer has an allergy he cannot recover; yet, as
pointed out earlier, the court stated the qualification that the allergy of
the buyer must be wholly unknown to the seller.2 2 A negative inference
from this would seem to be that if the seller knew of the possible ill
effect on the buyer, i.e., knew of any buyer who was allergic to the
product, the seller would be liable on his warranty. It is hoped the court
did intend to place this qualification on the decision in the principal
case. It is also submitted that if the allergy to the product is of the
more common type the seller should be liable on his warranty even
though the seller has no actual knowledge of the product's possible ill
1" Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N. J. L. 21, 4 A. 2d 73 (1939) (hat
dyes); Drake v. Herrman, 261 N. Y. 414, 185 N. E. 685 (1933) (hair dyes);
Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E. 252 (1922) (fur dyes) ; Antowill
v. Friedmann, 197 App. Div. 230, 188 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1921) (x-rays).
17 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E. 252 (1922).
"8 Compare "an implied warranty of fitness does not extend to fitness in respect
to matters wholly unknown to the dealer and peculiar to the individual buyer,"
with the North Carolina Court's language above.11 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 106-136 (1939) is a statutory example which provides
that if the seller properly labels his product as to the injurious substance it will
not be deemed adulterated.
-' 136 Me. 118, 3 A. 2d 650 (1939).21Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N. C. 268, 269, 90 S. E. 2d 392, 393 (1955).
' Ibid.
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effects on the sensitive buyer. Of course if the allergy is to common and
well known substances such as strawberries, tomatoes, and pollen, a
different legal consequence should naturally follow. In such cases the
buyer can be expected to avoid the common substances to which he is
allergic.
HAMLIN WADE.
Trade Regulations-Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as originally passed in 1914 read, in
part:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."1
The original Section 7 was passed to supplement the Sherman Act 2 by
forestalling restraints of trade and monopolization at an earlier stage
than did that act. By judicial interpretation, an actual showing of
conspiracy,3 monopolization, 4 predatory practices, 5 or an intent to
restrain trade" was held necessary in order to invoke the restraints of
the Sherman Act. By the time this evidence was available to the gov-
ernment, the merger involved had already taken place, and the govern-
ment then faced the difficult task of breaking up a corporation already
integrated into one operating unit. The original Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act was intended "to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and
monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation."' 7 Since the
most prevalent method of corporate merger at that time was the acquisi-
tion of the stock of one corporation by another, the original act was
aimed at such acquisitions. By judicial interpretation,8 mergers were
held not to be within the purview of the statute if the acquiring corpora-
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1914).226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1951).
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 149 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
9 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. United States, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir.1915).
7 H. R. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6553 (1914).
" Swift and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926). A
Company acquired the stock of B Company. The government brought suit under
the old Section 7. Prior to judgment A Company used the stock to acquire the
assets of B Company. The court held that the acquisition of the assets was a
legal transaction and that A Company could be required to divest itself only of
the now worthless stock. This became known as the "jurisdictional loophole"
and relegated old Section 7 to insignificance.
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tion acquired the assets of the acquired corporation as well as its stock.
Thus the original Section 7 lost most of its effectiveness, and corporate
mergers continued unabated through the use of this so-called "jurisdic-
tional loophole."
Obviously any amendment to the statute would be concerned pri-
marily with plugging this loophole. A comparison of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as amended in 1950 with the original version bears this
out. The section as amended reads:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." (Emphasis added.)
A reading of this section shows that in attempting to solve one prob-
lem, Congress has created another. Note that if assets are acquired,
there is little doubt that the section is not applicable unless the ac-
quired corporation is engaged in commerce.' 0 This much is clear. The
section expressly provides that "no corporation . .. shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce. .. ." However, in transactions involving the purchase of
stock, the section is vague in regard to whether the corporation whose
stock is acquired must be engaged in interstate commerce. One eminent
authority"' has taken the position that the acquired corporation need not
be engaged in commerce where stock is acquired in order for the act to
apply, on the grounds that it would be a grammatical strain to attempt
to construe the words "of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce" as referring back and qualifying the words "of the stock or other
share capital." He contends that if Congress did intend for the phrase
to qualify both stock and asset acquisitions, it should have inserted a
comma after the word "assets" thus making it grammatically possible.
However, a diagram of the sentence shows that with or without such
comma it is grammatically impossible for "of another corporation en-
gaged also in commerce" to modify "the stock or other share capital."
Therefore, since no court has yet construed this section, any reasonable
interpretation must result from the evident congressional intent as seen
in the light of common English usage.
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1951).
"0 "Commerce," as used in the act, means interstate commerce.
"McElroy, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 5 BAYLOR L. REv. 121 (1953).
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A comparison of the old section with the amended version shows
that Congress re-enacted Section 7 using the identical language of the
original section except that the phrase "and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets" (emphasis added) was inserted into
the body of the paragraph. Thus it can be seen that Congress intended
the act to read in effect as follows:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . .
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of an-
other corporation engaged also in commerce and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire.., the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce ... "
The phrase "of another corporation engaged also in commerce" clearly
was intended to relate back and qualify the prohibition against the ac-
quisition of both stock and assets just as the qualifying clause that
follows ("where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion. . . .") also relates back and qualifies both types of prohibitions.
. Furthermore, an interpretation of the Act in the light of common
English usage gives a result in accord with the obvious intent of Con-
gress regardless of the grammatical strain referred to previously. If
the alternate construction (that "of another corporation engaged also in
commerce" does not relate to stock acquisitions) were attempted, it
would result in a sentence the meaning of which would be left to con-
jecture-i.e.:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire .
the stock or other share capital where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition. .. "
In reading this sentence and arriving at "the stock or other share cap-
ital," the quaere immediately arises, "The stock or other share capital
of what?" The use of the adjective "the" before the noun "stock"
clearly indicates that the stock or other share capital of something spe-
cific is necessary in order to give significance to the sentence. "[Tlhe"
specific "stock or other share capital" referred to necessarily must be
that "of another corporation engaged also in commerce."
Of course, it is possible that Congress did desire to distinguish be-
tween stock and asset acquisitions. It may be that there was an intention
to prohibit the buying up of stock of both interstate and intrastate
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corporations while prohibiting asset acquisitions only if the acquired
corporation was of an interstate nature. If this be so, a look at para-
graph two of Section 7 shows that Congress probably has enacted a pro-
vision in excess of its powers. Paragraph two reads:
"No corporation shall acquire the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no corporation subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged in
commerce where the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition. .. ."
Note that in this situation the acquiring corporation does not have to be
engaged in commerce. Congress, by paragraph two, obviously wished
to prohibit a lessening of competition in the competitive pattern of the
market area where interstate firms are acquired by intrastate firms.
Thus, if the phrase "of one or more corporations engaged in commerce"
does not relate back and qualify the prohibition of stock acquisitions, the
following construction will result:
"No corporation shall acquire the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital where ... the effect of such acquisition...
may be substantially to lessen competition. .. ."
The net result of such a construction is the highly dubious condemnation
of an acquisition by a firm not engaged in commerce of the stock of a
firm also not engaged in commerce. Surely it cannot be contended that
the authority of Congress extends that far, or that such was the result
intended by an act whose sponsors asserted would not injure small
business.12
Therefore, while faulty draftsmanship of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act leaves it open to a possible dual construction, it appears that there
is only one which is both reasonable and in accord with what seems to
be the legislative intent. However, in order to insure future effective-
ness of this section, Congress should redraft the statute in clear language
lest it again be adjudicated into obscurity as was the old section.
TED G. WEST.
12 The act was designed "to limit the future increases in the level of economic
concentration resulting from corporate mergers . . . and thereby aid in preserving
small business as an important competitive factor in the American economy."
S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
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